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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Plaintiff brought this action to foreclose a mechanic's
lien for painting labor and supplies furnished to the home of
defendant Debra L. Youngman.

(Record at 2-8).

Plaintiff

commenced his work in June 1988 and completed his work August
30, 1988.

(Record at 79). In July 1988 Ameristar Financial

Corporation (hereinafter "Ameristar") loaned defendant Youngman
the sum of $320,000.00 to refinance existing encumbrances
against defendant Youngman's home, which encumbrances predated
plaintiff's first work.

(Record at 98-101).

Defendant

Security Pacific is a successor-in-interest, through
assignment, to Ameristar.

(Record at 102-103).

Defendant

Security Pacific vigorously defended plaintiff's mechanic's
lien action on grounds that defendant Security Pacific was
subrogated to the position of the encumbrances satisfied by
funds advanced by Ameristar at the request of defendant
Youngman, and that defendant Security Pacific had priority over
the mechanic1s

lien of plaintiff to the extent of the

encumbrances so paid.
Proceedings and Disposition Below
Plaintiff initiated this action to foreclose his
mechanic's lien by filing a complaint in the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on August

2

15, 1989.

Plaintiff named as defendants Debra L. Youngman,

Deborah Diamanti, Ameristar Financial Corporation and
Associates Financial Services Company, Inc.

(Record at 2 ) .

On or about February 1, 1990, plaintiff moved for summary
judgment against defendant Debra L. Youngman and requested a
default judgment against all other named defendants except
defendant Diamanti.
unopposed.

(Record at 3 1 ) . That motion was

On May 8, 1990, the court signed a summary judgment

and a decree of foreclosure in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants Debra L. Youngman, Ameristar Financial Corporation
and Associates Financial Services Company, Inc.

(Record at 75).

Thereafter, on June 25, 1990, on motion of plaintiff, the
court entered an order authorizing plaintiff to amend his
complaint to name Security Pacific and First Boston Mortgage
Securities Corporation (hereinafter "First Boston") as
additional parties defendant.

(Record at 65).

Defendant

Security Pacific filed an answer to plaintiff's amended
complaint on July 16, 1990.

(Record at 67).

Plaintiff's

complaint was not served on First Boston and said defendant did
not make an appearance.

The interest of First Boston had been

assigned to Security Pacific on October 15, 1988.

(Record at

103).
On March 11, 1991, plaintiff filed a motion for summary
judgment against defendants First Boston and Security Pacific.
On or about March 25, 1991 defendant Security Pacific filed a
cross motion for summary judgment.

3

The facts stated in both

motions were undisputed and on May 13, 1991 the court entered
its minute entry granting plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment and denying defendant Security Pacific's motion for
summary judgment.

(Record at 261). The court entered its

order with respect to the motions for summary judgment on
August 20, 1991 and an amended judgment and decree of
foreclosure was also entered on August 20, 1991.

(Record at

298-302).
The court entered its final order on December 2, 1991 by
dismissing plaintiff's complaint without prejudice as against
defendant Deborah Diamanti.

(Record at 310).

Defendant

Security Pacific's notice of appeal was filed in the district
court on December 9, 1991.

(Record at 318).

Statement of Facts
(See Appendix, Exhibit 1)
1.

Or or about May 15, 1985, defendant Debra Youngman

entered into a uniform real estate contract for the purchase of
real property located at 983 East 3rd Avenue, Salt Lake City,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah and more particularly described
as follows:
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 27,
Plat "G", Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence West
135 ft; thence North 130 ft; thence East 135 ft; thence
South 130 feet to the point of beginning.
A non-exclusive easement for ingress and egress over and
across the following: Alley-way 16 feet wide adjoining
said land on the North. Situated in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
(Record at 97, 112).
2.

Defendant Youngman purchased the property from

4

Lafayette Properties, Inc., a Utah Corporation, for the sum of
$420,000.00.
3.

(Record at 97, 112).

Defendant Youngman paid the sum of $25,000.00 at the

time of closing and contracted to make annual payments of
$25,000.00 plus accrued interest thereafter until May 15, 1989
at which time the entire unpaid principal balance and accrued
interest was to be due and payable.
4.

(Record at 113).

At the time defendant Youngman purchased the aforesaid

property, it was subject to the following encumbrances, each of
which was reflected in the records of the Salt Lake County
Recorder:
a.

A deed of trust dated March 1, 1985 and recorded

April 25, 1985 as Entry No. 4078404 in Book 5648, Page 2333, in
the amount of $95,000.00 in favor of Joseph Bunce as
beneficiary.
b.

(Record at 98, 127).

A deed of trust dated April 15, 1985 and recorded

April 25, 1985 as Entry No. 4078405 in Book 5648, Page 2334, in
the amount of $4,130.00 in favor of Jacob Tal as beneficiary.
(Record at 98, 128).
c.

A deed of trust dated April 22, 1985 and recorded

April 25, 1985 as Entry No. 4078406 in Book 5648, Page 2336, in
the amount of $40,000.00 in favor of Zella Jeanne Jensen as
beneficiary.
d.

(Record at 99, 131).

An all-inclusive deed of trust dated April 15, 1985

and recorded April 25, 1985 as Entry No. 4078408 in Book 5648,
at Page 2340, in the amount of $284,239.80, in favor of Gail
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Zscheile as beneficiary.
5.

(Record at 99, 134).

On or about June 13, 1988, defendant Youngman applied

for a loan from Ameristar Financial Corporation ("Ameristar"),
to refinance her obligations under the aforesaid uniform real
estate contract.
6.

(Record at 99-100, 151-152, 212-213).

Between June 13, 1988 and July 1, 1988, the following

documents were completed and submitted to Ameristar as part of
the underwriter's approval process:
a.

A residential loan application (Fannie Mae form

1003, rev. 10/86) executed by defendant Youngman on June 13,
1988.

(Record at 212-213).
b.

(Appendix Exhibit 6 ) .

An affidavit and agreement (Fannie Mae form 1009,

rev. 8/86) executed by defendant Youngman on July 1, 1988.
(Record at 214-215).
c.

(Appendix Exhibit 6 ) .

A transmittal summary (Fannie Mae form 1008, rev.

10/85) dated June 28, 1988 prepared by Ameristar underwriter
Angela K. Garza.
d.

(Record at 208, 216).

(Appendix Exhibit 6 ) .

A loan status and conditions summary dated June 28,

1988 signed by Angela K. Garza, underwriter.
221).

(Record at 209,

(Appendix Exhibit 6 ) .
e.

Lender's closing instructions to U.S. Title of Utah

dated July 1, 1988 prepared by Ginger Sickler, loan closer for
Ameristar.
7.

(Record at 100, 147-152, 217-220).

The aforesaid uniform real estate contract was

recorded on June 29, 1988 as Entry No. 4643837 in Book 6043 at
page 347 in the official records of the Salt Lake County

6

Recorder.
8.

(Record at 101,112).

On July 7, 1988 the loan from Ameristar to defendant

Youngman was closed.

As part of that loan closing, Lafayette

Properties conveyed fee title to defendant Youngman by warranty
deed recorded July 7, 1988 as Entry No. 4647261 in Book 6045 at
page 979 in the official records of the Salt Lake County
Recorder.
9.

(Record at 101,172).

The total amount loaned by Ameristar to defendant

Youngman was $320,000.00.

Of that amount, the sum of

$303,545.95 was disbursed to payoff all obligations reflected
by recorded encumbrances against the subject property.

The

disbursements were made by U.S. Title Company on July 7, 1988,
as follows:
a.

Joseph Bunce - $86,414.00, check no. 2265
(Record at 177, 183).

b.

Jacob Tal - $1,615.95, check no. 2266
(Record at 180, 186).

c.

Zella Jeanne Jensen - $10,000.00, check no. 2267
(Record at 179, 185).

d.

Lafayette Properties - $53,546.00, check no. 2268
(Record at 178, 184).

e.

Gail Zscheile - $151,970.05, check no. 2269
(Record at 176, 182).

(Record at 101, 154-159).
10.

None of the loan proceeds were distributed to

defendant Youngman.

The balance of the loan proceeds was

applied toward closing costs.

In fact, the aforesaid

disbursements and closing costs exceeded $320,000.00, the
amount of the loan.

(Record at 145, 218, 220).
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11.

As security for the loan to defendant Youngman,

Ameristar received a trust deed in the amount of $320,000.00
which was recorded on July 7, 1988 as Entry No. 4647262 in Book
6045 at page 980 in the official records of the Salt Lake
County Recorder.
12.

(Record at 102, 187-193).

On July 22, 1988, deeds of reconveyance were recorded

with respect to the aforedescribed trust deeds in favor of
Joseph Bunce, Jacob Tal, Zella Jeanne Jensen and Gail
Zscheile.
13.

(Record at 102, 194-197).
In June 1988, plaintiff entered into a contract with

defendant Youngman to provide painting labor and materials to
defendant Youngmanfs home.

Plaintiff commenced work upon the

subject property sometime prior to June 29, 1988.

(Record at

36, 99).
14.

Defendant Youngman paid plaintiff the sum of

$4,000.00 for painting labor and materials supplied by
plaintiff.
15.

(Record at 36).

Plaintiff completed his work on August 30, 1988 and

filed a notice of lien on November 16, 1988, recorded as Entry
No. 4702325 in Book 6081 at page 2039 in the official records
of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
16.

(Record at 36, 39, 198-200).

At the time plaintiff commenced his work, the

property was subject to encumbrances which totaled $303,545.95.
(Record at 98-99, 101, 127-131).
17.

In applying for the loan from Ameristar, defendant

Youngman stated that the purpose of the loan was to consolidate
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existing obligations at a lower interest rate and agreed that
the loan would be secured by a first deed of trust against the
subject property.
18.

(Record at 100, 151-152, 212-213).

On July 1, 1988, defendant Youngman signed an

affidavit and agreement that she had not given or permitted or
contracted to give or permit any lien upon the property to
secure a debt or loan, except in connection with financing
subordinate to Ameristar.
19.

(Record at 100, 149-150, 214-215).

It was the expectation of Ameristar, based upon the

representations of defendant Youngman, that Ameristar would
have a first lien as security for the loan to defendant
Youngman.

It was the policy of Ameristar not to make loans

which were not secured by first liens.

(Record at 168-171,

205-209, 212, 213).
20.

The loan status and conditions statement prepared by

Angela K. Garza, underwriter for Ameristar, reflects that
Ameristar anticipated that the security for the loan would be a
first mortgage on the subject property and that there would be
no cash given back to the borrower.

Similarly, the transmittal

summary prepared by Angela Garza reflects that the loan was to
be secured by a first mortgage and that the loan was to
refinance existing loans against the subject property.

(Record

at 170-171, 208-209).
21.

On October 15, 1988 Ameristar assigned its deed of

trust to First Boston.

On October 15, 1988, First Boston

assigned the deed of trust to defendant Security Pacific.
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(Record at 102-103, 201, 202).
22.

Defendant Youngman defaulted under the terms of her

trust deed note with Ameristar, and defendant Security Pacific,
successor-in-interest to Ameristar, proceeded with a
nonjudicial foreclosure of the deed of trust by trustee's sale
in July 1990.
23.

(Record at 247-248).

Defendant Security Pacific was the successful bidder

at the trustee's sale, bidding an amount less than the
outstanding encumbrances paid by the proceeds of the loan from
Ameristar, which bid was approximately $230,000.00.

(Record at

248).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Defendant Security Pacific seeks to have this court
reverse the summary judgment entered by the trial court
granting priority to plaintiff's mechanic's lien over the trust
deed of defendant Security Pacific.

While it is undisputed

that the trust deed of defendant's predecessor-in-interest,
Ameristar, was recorded subsequent to the time plaintiff
commenced to furnish painting labor and materials to the
subject property, under the principle of equitable subrogation,
Ameristar is treated as an assignee of the encumbrances
satisfied from the funds advanced by Ameristar.
Hickenlooper, 90 Utah 150, 59 P.2d 1139 (1936).

Martin v.
Those

encumbrances were recorded threo years prior to the time
plaintiff's mechanic's lien attached.
The doctrine of equitable subrogation is applied in
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instances where a third party pays the debt of another under an
agreement, express or implied, that the third party will be
subrogated to or receive security equal to that of the original
creditor.

It was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court as early

as 1897 in Johnson v. Tootle, 14 Utah 482, 47 P. 1033 (1897)
and George v. Butler, 16 Utah 111, 50 P. 1032 (1897).

Since

that time this court has played a major role in the development
of the doctrine of equitable subrogation.

Martin v.

Hickenlooper, supra, is a leading case which has been cited and
relied upon by many other jurisdictions.

It is the principal

case in an ALR Annotation treating the subject of subrogation
and has been repeatc^dly cited as authority in real property
treatises.

In Martin v. Hickenlooper, supra, and subsequent

Utah cases, this court has taken a liberal approach to the
application of equitable subrogation, recognizing it as "a
wholesome and meritorious doctrine" which "is now highly
favored in equity."

59 P.2d at 1140.

This court has applied equitable subrogation to give
priority to later recorded trust deeds or mortgages over
intervening (1) mortgages, (2) judgment liens, (3) equitable
liens and (4) fee-title interests.

The related principle of

renewal mortgage has likewise been applied by this court to
grant priority to later recorded trust deeds or mortgages over
intervening judgment liens and this court has acknowledged its
potential application vis-a-vis an intervening mechanic's lien.
To provide protection to those who enhance the value of
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property by supplying labor or materials, the Utah mechanic's
lien statutes are construed broadly.

Accordingly, labor and

material suppliers are allowed to base their lien priority on
the commencement of an improvement to the property.

Even so,

mechanic's liens are still subject to whatever liens are of
record at the time work is commenced on the property.
Equitable subrogation treats the satisfaction of a prior
mortgage by a third party as an assignment of the prior
mortgage to the third party.

Intervening mechanic's lien

claimants are left in the same position they would have
occupied had the earlier encumbrance not been satisfied.

This

view is consistent with Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-5.
The later mortgage is treated as an assignment of the earlier
mortgage, attaching as of the recordation of the earlier
mortgage, and not as a mortgage attaching subsequent to the
commencement of work upon the property.
The cases which have addressed the application of
equitable subrogation vis-a-vis an intervening mechanic's lien,
have not distinguished the equities of a mechanic's lien
claimant from those of any other type of intervening lien
claimant.

Cases which have denied subrogation to a later

lender as against an intervening mechanic's lien claimant, have
done so not because of the nature of the mechanic's lien, but
because the facts of the cases did not justify the application
of equitable subrogation.

Similarly, the cases which have

applied equitable subrogation as against an intervening
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mechnanic's lien claimant have not differentiated a mechanic's
lien from any other lien.
The facts of this case compel the application of equitable
subrogation in favor of defendant Security Pacific.

Had

defendant Youngman not refinanced the encumbrances against her
home, plaintiff's lien would have been junior to outstanding
encumbrances in excess of $300,000.00.

He did not provide

painting labor and materials with the expectation of being
entitled to a first lien on the property to secure the payment
of his bill.

On the* other hand, Ameristar advanced funds upon

assurances from def€$ndant Youngman that Ameristar would have a
first lien against the subject property to secure its loan of
$320,000.00.
The proceeds of the loan from Ameristar went directly to
satisfy the outstanding encumbrances against the property in
the amount of $303,545.95.
to closing costs.

The balance of the loan was applied

None of the loan proceeds were paid directly

to defendant Youngman.

The expectation of Ameristar was that

it would have a first lien to secure its loan.
Because equitable subrogation is based upon an express or
implied agreement and has as its objective complete and
substantial justice among the parties, any negligence on the
part of the lender invoking subrogation is not important unless
that negligence rises to the level of culpable or gross
negligence such as to shift the equities in favor of the
intervening lien claimant.

Ordinary negligence is not
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sufficient to bar equitable subrogation.

Assuming, arguendo,

that Ameristar did not take notice of the painting labor and
materials supplied to the subject property by plaintiff, that
fact, under the authorities, does not preclude the application
of equitable subrogation, particularly in light of the fact
that plaintiff was charged with notice of the existing
encumbrances against the property.
Accordingly, the trust deed of Ameristar, which was
assigned to defendant Security Pacific, should be subrogated to
the position of the encumbrances paid by the funds advanced by
Ameristar to the extent of $303,545.95 plus accrued interest.
The mechanic's lien of plaintiff is junior to that amount, but
is senior to the balance of the funds advanced by Ameristar.
By reason of the fact that the successful bid at the Trustee's
sale in July 1990 was less than the amount to which defendant
Security Pacific was subrogated, the mechanic's lien of
plaintiff became extinguished by that sale.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
FOR NEARLY A CENTURY THIS COURT HAS RECOGNIZED EQUITABLE
SUBROGATION AS A WHOLESOME AND MERITORIOUS DOCTRINE AND
HAS AFFORDED IT LIBERAL APPLICATION.
Subrogation originated in and was borrowed from Roman
Law. 1

More recently, the doctrine appeared in eighteenth

1

4 American Law of Property, section 16.145 (A.J. Casner ed.
1952).
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century France and its modern development draws on the civil
law of that period.2

It is closely related to the constructive

trust, nonconsensual equitable lien,3 suretyship and
restitution.4
Below follows a discussion of the Utah cases which have
discussed the related doctrines5 of equitable subrogation and
renewal mortgage.^
dominant themes.

The cases and the theories present two

First, under circumstances in which a lien or

interest of a third party has unknowingly intervened, money is
lent or paid upon an understanding that the money shall be used
to satisfy or acquire an interest superior to that of the
intervener's, or is advanced as a continuation of a prior
debt.

Secondly, in those circumstances in which application of

the doctrines is appropriate the person or entity advancing the
funds is afforded a priority ov t the intervenor for the reason
that application of the doctrine does not materially impact the

2

id.

3 Id.
^ G. Nelson and D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law, 2nd
Edition 1985, p. 706.
5

American Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Helgensen, 12 P. 26 at
27 (Wash 1917).
6 In addition to the two principal doctrines discussed, the
doctrines of purchase money mortgage, Nelson v. Stoker, 669
P.2d 390 (Utah 1983) and that of a vendor's security interest,
Butler v. Williamson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987) may afford
priority over intervening or pre-existing liens.
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position of the intervenor.'
A. Early Utah Cases Recognize The Equitable Doctrines Of
Subrogation And Renewal Mortgage In Establishing The
Priorities Of Competing Interests In Real Property.
The origins of the doctrines in Utah appear to be found in
in Johnson v. Tootle, 14 Utah 482, 47 P. 1034 (1897) where this
court applied subrogation under facts in which an owner of a
property subject to a trust deed had a judgment entered against
him.

Subsequent to the entry of the judgment, the owners sold

the property.

Under the terms of the sale the purchaser agreed

to pay off the preexisting trust deed based upon
representations that it was the only encumbrance against the
property.

Without knowledge of the intervening judgment lien,

the purchaser paid the obligation secured by the prior trust
deed and it was reconveyed.
In affirming the trial court's subrogation of the
purchaser to the position of the prior trust deed, this court
noted that the deed of trust was a valid lien upon the property
in question and that the intervening judgment was subject to
that lien, that the respondent purchased the land in good faith
relying upon the representation that the deed of trust was the
only encumbrance upon the land and that the purchaser was "in
utter ignorance" of the judgment.

The court stated:

The general principle which runs through nearly all cases

7

Martin v. Hickenlooper, 59 P.2d 1139, 1151 (Utah 1936).
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of this character is that "when the legal rights of the
parties have been changed by mistake, equity restores them
to their former condition, when it can be done without
interfering with any new right acquired on the faith and
strength of the altered condition of the legal rights, and
without doing injustice to other persons." To apply this
principle in this case is to prevent manifest injustice
and hardship and its application will interfere with no
superior intervening equities. (Citation omitted;
quotation in original.)
47 P. at 1034.
George v. Butler, 16 Utah 111, 50 P. 1032 (Utah 1897), was
a case in which the defendant Butler, a lessee under a 25 year
lease describing Lot 6 Block 57, borrowed $2,500.00 in 1890
from the Pacific Investment Company and secured that loan with
an assignment of the lease.

Subsequently, in 1891 Butler

borrowed $1,000.00 from plaintiff George and secured that
obligation by giving a mortgage on the property described in
the lease.

The 1891 mortgage, however, misdescribed the

security as Lot 5 in Block 57 instead of Lot 6.

Approximately

two years later, in 1893 Butler borrowed an additional
$1,000.00 from the investment company and the investment
company took a deed of trust in the amount of $3,500.00 on the
same premises to secure the $1,000.00 note as well as the
$2,500.00 note.

At the time of this loan the officers and

agents of the investment company did not have actual notice of
plaintiff's mortgage.

Two years subsequent to this loan in

1895, Butler borrowed $3,500.00 from one Sutherland for the
express purpose of paying his indebtedness to the investment
company.

Sutherland was granted a mortgage on Lot 6 to secure

the loan to Butler and the proceeds from the Sutherland loan
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actually paid the obligations owed the investment company.

The

notes were endorsed "paid" and all documents were delivered to
Sutherland.

At the time of this loan, Sutherland had no actual

knowledge of the loan to George and the abstract of title upon
which he relied did not make any reference to it.
George commenced an action to reform and foreclose his
mortgage, naming Sutherland as a party defendant.

The trial

court, by its decree, subrogated Sutherland to Pacific
Investment's first lien position on the mortgaged premises and
directed that he should be paid first to the extent of the
$2,500.00 and interest thereon.

In affirming the subrogation

of Sutherland to the lien of Pacific Investment Company this
court appears to have applied both equitable subrogation as
well as the renewal mortgage doctrine.

With regard to the

$1,000.00 loan from Pacific Investment in 1893, the court said:
The assignment and delivery of the lease by Butler, on
November 1, 1890, to Pacific Investment Company, as a
pledge to secure the $2,500.00 borrowed of the company on
that day, created a lien upon the property described in
favor of the company, and ... including that note in the
trust deed of February 1, 1893, without actual knowledge
of the mortgage [to plaintiff] ..., did not abrogate the
lien created by the pledge, for the reason that the
company did not know of the mortgage to the plaintiff, and
its agents understood they were acquiring the first lien
by the deed of trust; and the plaintiff was not prejudiced
by including the $2,500.00 in the trust deed.
50 P. at 1034.
With respect to the transaction in which Sutherland loaned
$3,500.00 to pay off the liens upon the property, the court
noted that Sutherland loaned his money to the owner of the
leasehold estate for the purpose of paying off the lien held by

18

the Pacific Investment Company, believing and expecting that he
would get the same security as that he had satisfied, but
afterward learned of the $1,000.00 mortgage held by the
plaintiff.

The court stated:

An application of the equitable doctrine of subrogation to
the transaction gives to [Sutherland] the security he was
lead to believe he was getting and the same that was held
by the creditor whose debt he paid, and [George] is left
with the same security he had before. Sutherland is
substituted for the investment company as creditor and
lienholder. No change is made in the rank or relative
priority of the securities. The transaction consisted of
mere immaterial changes as to its effect upon plaintiff's
equities. Equity applies the doctrine of subrogation to a
great variety of situations and emergencies arising in
human affairs. Its end is substantial justice, and we
think it is applicable to facts of this case.
50 P. at 1034.
Fullerton v. Bailey, 17 Utah 85, 53 P. 1020 (1898)
involved a mortgage upon land and owned by the estate of a
deceased.

The land covered by the mortgage, had, previous to

the settlement of the estate, been conveyed to the appellant by
the sole legatee under the decedent's will, with the
representation that there were no estate debts except the
mortgage in question and that the estate was solvent.

After

the appellant paid the mortgage, a claim was allowed in favor
of a brother of the deceased which claim absorbed the entire
estate and left the estate without assets to reimburse the
appellant the money paid to satisfy the mortgage.

The court

noted:
Plaintiff was led to believe that no claim such as was
presented by the brother of the deceased and allowed after
the time for the presentation of claims had expired,
existed, or that any claim would consume the entire
estate. Had plaintiff not paid the [prior] mortgage it
19

would have been foreclosed and the land lost to the
estate. The payment of the mortgage resulted in a benefit
to the estate and in injury to no one. If subrogation is
allowed, no one is injured by it, as the estate and the
heirs are no worse off. If the appellant is allowed to be
subrogated to the rights and positions occupied by [the
prior mortgagee] no one is injured and justice is meted
out to the parties. The facts to my mind present a clear
case calling for the application of the doctrine of
subrogation, which is not alone founded upon contract,
either express or implied, but upon principles of equity
and justice intended to offer protection to a meritorious
creditor, which does not conflict with the legal or
equitable rights of others....
53 P. at 1023.
In Badger Coal & Lumber Company v. 01sen, 50 Utah 307,
167 P. 680 (1917) the court addressed the renewal mortgage
doctrine in a mechanic's lien setting.

In that case an owner

of a parcel of land sold the property to a developer and took
six promissory notes as payment which were secured by a blanket
mortgage on 39 lots.

The mortgage provided for partial

releases of the mortgage as to particular lots as payments were
made.

Badger Coal and Lumber supplied materials to a home

being constructed on Lot 10 and subsequently the blanket
mortgage was released as to Lot 10. Two mortgages in favor of
the same mortgagee were recorded subsequently to Badger's
delivery of materials.

With language in which the similarities

in the rationale and application of the doctrines of equitable
subrogation and that of renewal mortgage can be seen, the court
quoted approvingly from 2 Jones on Mortgages, Section 971:
When a new mortgage is substituted in ignorance of an
intervening lien, the mortgage, released through mistake,
may be restored in equity and given its original priority
as a lien. ... [and] it was considered that although the
court was not at liberty to infer facts not proved, yet
that it was at liberty to draw all the inferences which
20

logically and naturally follow from the facts proved;
[and] that it was not an act of reasonable prudence and
caution such as men commonly use in the conduct of
business affairs for one having a first mortgage upon
property, without consideration or other apparent motive,
to release it, and take a new mortgage subject to a prior
lien of a considerable amount; and therefore it may be
inferred that the mortgagee would not have made the
release had he known of the intervening mortgage.
167 P. at 682.
In holding that the facts of that case did not fall within
the renewal doctrine, the court noted that the two subsequent
mortgages were taken for the specific purpose of obtaining
additional security which was to be derived from the
improvements constructed and that the notes which the mortgage
secured were not a renewal of the prior obligation or part
thereof.

Id. at 682.

B. In Later Opinions This Court Recognized Two
Classifications Of The Equitable Doctrine Of Subrogation;
Legal Subrogation And Conventional Or Equitable
Subrogation.
The distinction between the two branches of subrogation,
legal subrogation and equitable or conventional subrogation,
was first discussed in Bingham v. Walker Brothers Bankers, 75
Utah 147, 283 P. 1059 (1929).

That case involved the competing

rights of two decedentsf estates in shares of common stock.

In

explaining the doctrine of subrogation, the court stated:
Subrogation is a remedy highly favored in equity. It
seems to have first been applied in favor of sureties, but
has been greatly extended.
*

*

*

Where the person who pays the debt of another stands in
the situation of a surety or is compelled to pay to
protect his own right or property, the right of the
subrogation is a consequence which equity attaches to such
a condition, and the right of subrogation under such
circumstances is not the direct result of an agreement.
21

This in the law is termed "legal subrogation." In
addition to the principle of legal subrogation, there
exists another principle termed "conventional
subrogation", which occurs where one who is under no
obligation to make the payment and who has no right or
interest to protect pays the debt of another under an
agreement, express or implied, that he will be subrogated
to the rights of the original creditor, made with either
the debtor or the creditor. (Citations omitted.)
283 P. 1062, 1063.

In Bingham v. Walker Brothers Bankers the

court held that neither legal or conventional subrogation was
applicable to the facts of the case.

Because there was no

compulsion upon the bank to pay the obligation in order to
protect its interest, legal subrogation was not applicable.
Similarly, since the court held the bank to be a volunteer,
equitable subrogation was not applicable; there being no
agreement, express or implied, that the bank was to be
subrogated^ to the rights of the original creditor.
C. The Modern View Adopted By This Court Applies
Equitable Subrogation Where There Is An Express Or Implied
Agreement As A Matter Of Doing Justice Under The
Circumstances.
In 1936 this court issued its landmark decision of Martin
v. Hickenlooper, 90 Utah 150, 59 P.2d 1139, 107 ALR 762 (1936),
(see Appendix, Exhibit 2 ) .

This decision is widely cited upon

b

"An agreement that a mortgage shall be kept alive in favor of
one who advances money to pay it, and that he shall be
subrogated to its lien, is not necessary to effect such
subrogation as against the holder of an inferior judgment lien,
the existence of which he is ignorant, if he makes the advance
with the understanding that the mortgage shall be satisfied and
that he shall have a first lien upon the property." Southern
Cotton Oil Company v. Napoleon Hill Oil Company, 158 S.W. 1082
(Arkansas 1913).
22

the issue of equitable subrogation.^

in Hickenlooper, the

court completed an extensive survey of the doctrine, its
history and development in the United States as well as its
application.

In summarizing its review the court stated:

From our study we draw the following conclusions: (1)
That where a lender, in no way related to the property nor
in any way required to protect an interest, advanced the
money to pay off a lien, it could not be a case for legal
subrogation, but must, if anything, come within the
principles of conventional subrogation. (2) That in
conventional subrogation there must be an agreement,
express or implied, that the lender whose money pays off a
lien will have the same status as the lien his money
releases to the extent of the debt secured by that lien.
(3) That equity applies the doctrine of subrogation in
such cases, not in exacting a performance of the contract,
but as a matter of doing justice under the circumstances;
the so called agreement only being of value showing such a
situation where the doctrine should be applied in order to
do justice and as evidence that the lender was not a
volunteer. (4) That the facts or circumstances from
which the agreement will be implied vary in the different
courts, some requiring evidence from which an actual
understanding between the parties may be inferred, while
others hold that payment under such circumstances as show
that the lender "supposed" or "intended" to get security
of the same dignity as that released by his payment is
sufficient; and some go as far as holding that such
intention may be inferred from the mere fact that the
money was advanced for the purpose of paying off another
lien. (5) That according to the modern view, indiligence
in searching the record will not prevent equity from
applying the doctrine unless it is culpable or
unjustifiable negligence, and that where there is an
express agreement to subrogate or one from which such
understanding can plainly be implied, the failure to look
up the record will not stay the hand of equity for the
reason that equity will treat the matter as if there was
an assignment which was in effect what the parties
intended; that in case of assignment the record would not
need to be searched.
59 P.2d 1151,1152.

y

e.g. G. Nelson and D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law, 2nd
Edition, 1985, p. 708, Notes 9,10 and 13; 4 American Law of
Property, (A.J. Casner ed. 1952), page 344-345, Notes 8, 9, 13,
15, 18, 19.
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In Hickenlooper this court upheld the trial court's decree
of subrogation where a subsequent mortgagee had advanced funds
for the purpose of paying off a prior loan.

The property in

question was originally owned by Mr. and Mrs. C. H. Stovens and
on February 1, 1921, the Stovens' executed a mortgage for
$3,500.00 in favor of the State of Utah.

On June 18, 1921, the

Stovens conveyed the mortgaged property to Clara C.
Hickenlooper subject to the mortgage.

Two days later, on June

20, 1921, Clara C. and W. A. Hickenlooper, her husband,
mortgaged the premises to Martin to secure two notes of even
date in the aggregate amount of $2,500.00.

Thereafter, on

February 24, 1922, Hickenloopers conveyed the property subject
to the two above specified mortgages to the Fritsch Loan and
Trust Company.

On June 1, 1927, the Fritsch Loan and Trust

Company delivered to Mrs. Zorn a mortgage to secure its note in
the amount of $3,500.00.

This mortgage did not specify that it

was subject to any other mortgages.

The State's mortgage was

released on the same day, June 1, 1927, by reason of the money
advanced by Mrs. Zorn.

On the same day, an abstract was

furnished to Mrs. Zorn certified January 12, 1927, the
$1,000.00 note payable to Martin had been paid, but the
$1,500.00 note together with interest thereon remained unpaid.
Martin brought an action to foreclose, joining Mrs. Zorn
among others.

She cross-complained and answered.

As to

Martin, she claimed a priority on the ground that her money was
used to pay off the State's note, that it was intended for that
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purpose, and that the Fritsch Loan and Trust Company, by and
through its general manager and secretary, agreed that Mrs.
Zorn's mortgage was to be a first lien and that he made
representations to Zorn that it was such.

Mrs. Zorn had no

knowledge that Martin had a mortgage on the property until he
brought suit.

She never examined, nor caused to be examined,

either the abstract or the record.

The evidence was that she

trusted the general manager and that he said she did not need a
lawyer and that he would have his lawyer look it over.
In affirming the trial court's decree of subrogation this
court held:
Suffice it to say that where there is a promise on the
part of the mortgagor or his transferee, given to one who
pays money to pay off a lien, that such lender will be in
equally as good position as regards security as the
lienholder whose liens his money was intended to discharge
and did discharge. [sic] He will be considered in equity
as an assignee of the lien and especially where assurances
are given him that his lien will be or is a first lien.
The evidence in this case, we think, is amply sufficient
to establish such a promise, if not expressed at least
implied.
The court noted that the trial court correctly determined that
Mrs. Zorn should be paid first from the proceeds of the
Sheriff's sale.

The amount she was entitled to be paid was

established by the amount of debt Mrs. Zorn discharged, plus
interest at the rate set forth in that mortgage.

As to any

amount owed Mrs. Zorn in excess of the debt discharged, plus
interest, Martin had priority.

Finally the court reversed a

personal judgment in favor of Mrs. Zorn as against Stovens,
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noting that

,f

[t]he cases above speak of being subrogated to

thelien" [of the prior creditor] and not to the debt.

59 P.2d

at 1152-1153.
D. Recent Utah Cases Have Applied Principles Of Equitable
Subrogation To Grant Priority To Later Recorded Mortgages
Or Trust Deeds Over Intervening Judgment Liens, Equitable
Liens And Fee title Interests.
Twenty years passed before the court again directly faced
a subrogation question.10

In Tracy-Collins Trust Company v.

Goeltz, 5 Utah 2d 350, 301 P.2d 1086 (1956) the defendants
owned property as joint tenants from the date of acquisition to
March 31, 1952, when the property was awarded to the wife
Marion Goeltz in a divorce action.

Previously, on October 27,

1936, the defendants had executed a mortgage covering the real
property in question in favor of Tracy Loan and Trust Company,
plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest.

The mortgage secured a

payment of a promissory note in the principal amount of
$6,000.00.

On May 10, 1948, the husband, Francis Boydell

Goeltz executed a promissory note for $7,100.00.

To secure the

note, a mortgage covering the real property in question was
executed.

The $7,100.00 note and mortgage purported to bear

the signature of Mrs. Goeltz but the trial court found that
"the purported signature of appellant was not affixed to said

1U

Justice Wolfe however, explained the rationale of Martin v.
Hickenlooper in Federal Land Bank of Berkley v. Salt Lake
Valley Sand and Gravel, 96 Utah 359, 85 P.2d 791, 793 (1939).
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note and mortgage by appellant." 11

At the time Mr. Goeltz

discussed the loan with officers of the plaintiff, he was
advised that if the loan were made, it would be upon the
condition that the $6,000.00 mortgage, given October 27, 1936,
was to be paid off.

The papers were prepared and Mr. Goeltz

signed the papers at the plaintiff's place of business.
Representing his wife to be ill, Mr. Goeltz requested that he
be permitted to take the papers to her for her to sign.

Mr.

Goeltz returned the papers with what purported to be her
signature affixed to the note, the mortgage, and additional
papers.

A check was issued by plaintiff in favor of the

mortgagee under the 1936 mortgage and the balance of the loan
was disbursed to Mr. Goeltz.
Plaintiff commenced foreclosure of the 1948 mortgage and
the trial court subrogated plaintiff to the position of the
1936 mortgage.

The court ordered that Mr. and Mrs. Goeltz were

jointly and severally liable for $3,224.41 and Mr. Goeltz was
liable for and additional $3,576.70.

In affirming the trial

court's decree of subrogation, this court stated:
In this case [the bank] imposed as a condition to granting
the new loan that the 1936 mortgage be retired and the
[bank] have a first mortgage on the premises. It would
indeed be most inequitable to permit the payment by [the
bank] of the balance due under the 1936 mortgage under the
situation here disclosed and permit [Mrs. Goeltz] as well

11

Reported cases have addressed similar facts, (e.g. Kaminskas
v. Cepauskis, 218 N.E. 2d 218 (111. App. 1938) which involved
subrogation of the first lien mortgagee and Daminskas v.
Cepauski, 12 N.E. 2d 221 (111. App. 1938) which involved
subrogation of the second lien mortgagee under the same facts.
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as her former husband to receive a gratuity, unearned and
not justified, of the $3,224.41 paid to [the prior
mortgagee].
Appellant is in no worse position than had the respondent
taken assignment of the 1936 mortgage from [the prior
mortgagee] and a second mortgage for an additional amount
of approximately $3,900.00.
301 P.2d 1090.
In Irving Heights Corporation v. Pace, 29 Utah 2d 80,
505 P.2d 297 (1973), the plaintiff commenced an action to
recover damages from the county clerk of Summit County for the
clerk's failure to properly docket a transcript of judgment in
which one Reginald Saxton was the judgment debtor.

The

plaintiff had recovered a judgment in the Third Judicial
District court against Saxton in the amount of $1,030.00
together with $400.00 attorney's fees and costs.

Subsequently

a transcript of the judgment was forwarded to the defendant
Pace for entry on the judgment docket in Summit County.

The

judgment was docketed chronologically on June 13, 1968 but was
not indexed alphabetically until December 1970. At the time
the transcript of judgment was received by defendant, the
judgment debtors were mortgagors on a mortgage in favor of
First National Bank of Coalville.

On March 28, 1969, the

Saxtons executed a second mortgage in a larger amount which was
thereafter recorded.

The evidence showed that the second

mortgage was a renewal of the first.

The Saxtons defaulted on

the second mortgage and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, which was successor to the First National Bank of
Coalville, commenced an action to foreclose the mortgage.
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The

plaintiff was made a party defendant in the foreclosure
proceedings and it was decided that the plaintiff's judgment
lien was inferior to the second mortgage.
The plaintiff claimed in Irving Heights, that but for the
failure of the defendant to properly index the transcript of
judgment, its judgment lien would have intervened between the
first mortgage and the renewal mortgage and therefore would
have had a priority over the mortgage subsequently recorded.
This court held as follows:
The second mortgage being a renewal of the first, the
bank's mortgage lien resulting from the first mortgage
continued on at least in the amount of the first mortgage
even though it was subsequently released when the second
mortgage was recorded. (Citation omitted.) There being no
interruption in the mortgage lien, we are unable to see
how the plaintiff was damaged by the failure of the
defendant to properly index the transcript of judgment.
505 P.2d at 298.

This language resonates the dominate theme

common to the doctrine of equitable subrogation and that of a
renewal mortgage.

That is, when applicable, the position of

the intervening lien claimant is not materially changed by the
application of the doctrines.

The only practical difference

between the two doctrines appears to be with respect to the
identity of the subsequent mortgagee.

If the subsequent

mortgagee is the same as the original mortgagee, then the
renewal mortgage doctrine may be applicable.

If the subsequent

mortgagee is a new lender, then equitable subrogation may be
applicable.
Finally, and most recently, this court applied subrogation
principles in Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102 (Utah 1984).
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The

Hortons were divorced in 1977 and as part of the divorce decree
Mrs. Horton was awarded the parties residence subject to Mr.
Hortonfs equity interest in the amount of $30,000.00. To
secure his interest he remained an owner of record title.
Thereafter Mr. Horton subordinated his equity interest to the
security interests of two lenders.

The first loan was in the

amount of $35,000.00 from First Security Bank.

The second was

in the amount of $51,000.00 from Murray First Thrift.
Subsequently Mrs. Horton applied for a third
"consolidation loan" from Majestic Mortgage in the amount of
$112,500.00 for the purpose of paying off the first two loans
and obtaining additional sums for Mrs. Hortonfs investment
purposes.

Apparently, during the processing of this loan and

execution of the loan documents, a quit claim deed was
unintentionally executed by Mr. Horton which deed purported to
convey his interest to Mrs. Horton.

Mrs. Horton received the

loan proceeds in her own name and paid the First Security Bank
and Murray First Thrift obligations from those proceeds.

Later

she was unable to service Majesticfs mortgage and Majestic
commenced foreclosure.
The trial court found the elements of fraud necessary to
set the quit claim deed aside.

In affirming the trial court's

finding this court stated:
The purpose of an equity action is to restore the parties
to the status quo to the extent possible. (Citation
omitted.)
It is generally accepted that he who seeks equity must do
equity. (Citation omitted.) Thus, in order that the
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fraudulently acquired quit claim deed be set aside and Mr,
Horton's interest in the subject property be restored to
him, Mr. Horton must, to the extent possible, return to
Majestic the benefits received by him that he otherwise
would not have received. If Majestic had not paid off the
balances owing on the two loans from First Security and
Murray First Thrift to which Mr. Horton had voluntarily
subordinated his $30,000.00 equity interest, Horton's
interest would still be subordinate to that amount.
Thus, equity requires that Majestic, having paid
$86,700.00 to retire the mortgages to First Security and
Murray First Thrift, should have a priority over Mr.
Horton to the extent of that amount.
695 P.2d at 107.

Taken as a whole, it would appear that

Hickenlooper, and the cases before and after, hold with the
modern view, which regards equitable subrogation as a highly
favorable doctrine and affords it liberal application; the
fundamental rationale of the doctrine being, that where
appropriate, the application of the doctrine does not
materially change the position of the intervening interest.12
That position appears to be well supported by the decisions
from other forums which evidence the continuing viability of
the doctrine.13

1Z

"... to substitute one creditor for another would apparently
place the junior lienor in no worse position than he was."
Martin v. Hickenlooper, 59 P.2d at 1151, citing Jackson Trust
Company v. Gilkinson, 105 N.J.Eq. 116, 147 A. 113 (1929).
13

e.g.; Klotz v. Klotz, 440 N.W. 2d 406 (Iowa 1989); Smith v.
State Savings and Loan Association, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1092, 223
Cal. Rptr. 298 (1986); Caito v. United California Bank, 576
P.2d 466 (Cal. 1978); Turney v. Roberts, 501 S.W. 2d 601 (Ark.
1973); and Capabianco v. Bork, 256 A. 2d 76 (N.J. 1969).
31

POINT II
NEITHER THE CASES WHICH HAVE ADDRESSED EQUITABLE
SUBROGATION, NOR THE UTAH MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE
AFFORD ANY BASIS FOR DIFFERENTIATING THE APPLICATION
OF EQUITABLE SUBROGATION VIS-A-VIS AN INTERVENING
MECHANIC'S LIEN FROM ANY OTHER INTERVENING
REAL PROPERTY INTEREST
The above cases discussed have considered equitable
subrogation and the related doctrine of renewal mortgage in
various factual settings including intervening judgment liens,
intervening mortgages, claims upon decedent's estates,
equitable liens and fee title interests.

No Utah case has yet

addressed equitable subrogation as it affects the priority of
an intervening mechanic's lien.
A. Cases Which Have Denied The Doctrine Of Equitable
Subrogation Vis-a-Vis An Intervening Mechanic's Lien Have
Done So Because The Facts Of Those Cases Did Not Justify
Application Of The Doctrine.
There is however, no reason or rationale for denying the
application of the doctrine simply by virtue of the fact that
the form of the intervening interest is a mechanic's lien as
opposed to that of some other interest.

In Houston Investment

Banking v. First City Bank of Highland Village, 640 S.W. 2d 660
(Tex. App. 1982) the court subrogated a lender to the lien
rights of a prior vendor, affording it a priority over an
intervening judgment lien.

In relying upon Diversified

Mortgage Investors v. Blaylock General Contractors, Inc., 576
S.W. 2d 794 (Tex. 1978) the Texas Court of Appeals stated:
Although it involves a mechanic's lien instead of a
judgment lien, the fact pattern in regard to the Irving
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project in Diversified Mortgage Investors parallels the
facts of this case . . . . In both Diversified Mortgage
Investors and the present case the intervening lien (ie.
the mechanic's lien and the judgment lien, respectively)
had its inception prior to the date of recording the deed
of trust lien held by appellant•
660 S.W. 2d at 662-663.
Similarly, the various facts to which this court has
applied the equitable subrogation and renewal mortgage
doctrines, and the discussions in those cases, indicate no
basis for denying the application of equitable subrogation
solely by virtue of the fact that the intervening interest
takes the form of a mechanic's lien, assuming all other
criteria are satisfied.

Indeed, appellant's research upon this

issue has revealed no case in which equitable subrogation has
been denied over an intervening mechanic's lien on that basis
alone.
Appellant's research has however, revealed cases involving
intervening mechanics liens in which subrogation has been
denied due to the failure to satisfy the doctrine's
requirements:

Collateral Investment Company v. Pilgrim, 421

S.2d 1274 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982), (funds not advanced at
instance of debtor to satisfy prior encumbrance); Southwest
Title and Trust Co., Inc. v. Norman Lumber Company, 441 P.2d
430 (Okl. 1968), (no clear implication that subsequent
mortgagee was to have mortgage of equal dignity of that
discharged); Canton Morris Plan Bank v. Most, 184 N.E. 765
(Ohio 1932), (subrogation denied because mechanic's lien
claimants would be prejudiced by subrogation since bank was not
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ignorant of work done and materials supplied and knowingly
allowed artisans to enhance value of premises); Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company v. First Security Bank of Idaho, 491
P.2d 1261 (Idaho 1971), (subrogation denied because no evidence
of an express or implied agreement of subrogation); Fleetwood
v. Med Center Bank, 786 S.W. 2d 550 (Tex. App. 1990),
(subrogation denied because its application would result in
cognizable prejudice to junior lienholder); Peterson v. Zero
Estates, 261 N.E. 2d 346 (Minn. 1977), (subrogation denied
since subsequent loan was to finance continued construction and
bank had knowledge of construction).
B. The Purposes Of The Utah Mechanic's Lien Statute Are
Not Compromised By Application Of The Doctrine Of
Equitable Subrogation.
Further, an examination of the Utah mechanic's lien
statutes and the cases interpreting them afford no basis for
denying subrogation solely upon the fact that the intervening
lien is a mechanic's lien.

This conclusion is true even though

upon first blush, application of the doctrine of equitable
subrogation would appear to be in conflict with the priority
afforded a mechanic's lien pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Section 38-1-5 as fully set forth at pages 1-2 herein.
It is well established that the purpose of the mechanic's
lien statutes is to protect those who have added directly to
the value of property by performing labor or furnishing
materials.

AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development & Energy

Co., 714 P.2d 289 (1986); Stanton Transportation Company v.
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Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P. 2d 207 (1959). The statute is
designed to prevent a landowner from taking the benefit of
improvements to the property without paying for the labor and
materials incorporated into the improvements.

Frehner v.

Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446, 447 (1967), King Brothers
v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962).
The statute is remedial in nature and intended to give the lien
claimant the benefit of his bargain and will be broadly
construed to effect that purpose.

Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138

(Utah App. 1989) citing Interiors Contracting v. Navalco, 648
P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982).

There is no evidence however, in

the statutes or in the cases interpreting the statutes that
they are intended to grant a windfall to the lien claimants,
which in the absence of equitable subrogation, would occur in
this case.

Indeed, those jurisdictions in which the issue has

been presented have uniformly applied equitable subrogation
without distinction or regard to the fact that the intervening
interest is a mechanic's lien, when all other criteria were
satisfied.
C. Cases Which Have Applied Equitable Subrogation
Vis-a-Vis An Intervening Mechanic's Lien Have Accomplished
Substantial Justice Without Prejudicing The Rights Of The
Mechanic's Lien Claimants.
This court has previously given a strong indication that
is supports the view discussed in the preceeding subsection.
In both Martin v. Hickenlooper and Tracy-Collins Trust Company
v. Goeltz, the court quoted with approval from Jackson v.
Gilkinson, 105 N.J.Eq. 116,, 147 A. 113 (1929), (See Appendix,
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Exhibit 3), a case which addressed the subrogation of a
subsequently recorded mortgage over an intervening mechanicf s
lien.

That case is of particular significance both because it

has been approved by this court and because its facts are so
closely analogous to those of the instant case.
In Jackson Trust Company v. Gilkinson, defendant's
borrowed $8,500.00 from the plaintiff to pay off a first
mortgage which was in default and about to be foreclosed.

Of

that amount, $7,977.04 was paid to a first mortgagee and the
balance was applied to taxes. Approximately six weeks prior to
the execution and recordation of plaintiff's mortgage,
defendant had contracted with a mechanic's lien claimant for
the construction of a garage on the rear of the mortgaged
premises.

In noting that the defendants had delivered their

affidavit to plaintiffs to the effect there were no liens or
encumbrances against the property, the court stated:
The complainant, in my judgment, is entitled to be
subrogated to the amount paid by it in satisfaction of the
first mortgage ...
*

*

*

[W]here, as in the case sub judice, no one is injured by
the mistake, and no one has changed his position by reason
of the ... mistake, there is no good reason why the
mistake should not be corrected although the highest
degree of vigilance has not been exercised.
147 A. 114, 115.
In Peterman-Donnelly Engineers and Contractors v. First
National Bank of Arizona, Phoenix, 2 Ariz. App. 321, 408 P.2d
841 (1965), a case similar to the present action, the court
applied the doctrine of equitable subrogation in a case
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involving an intervening mechanic's lien.

In that case the

subject property was encumbered by a first mortgage in favor of
Eyre which was later paid from a larger construction loan made
by First National Bank.

Prior to the construction loan being

recorded, work had begun on the project and a mechanic's lien
had been filed by the plaintiff.

The court held equitable

subrogation to be applicable as follows:
The evidence supporting the [motion for summary judgment]
revealed that at the time the property in question was
conveyed to the Association from the Chamber [of
Commerce], it was understood that a part of the loan
forwarded by the appellee to the Association was to be
used to satisfy the debt to Eyre. It is likewise evident
from the depositions that appellee-bank regarded itself as
stepping into the shoes of Eyre. However no formal
assignment of the prior mortgage to appellee was executed,
but it is implicit that the parties intended the appellee
to have the security attached to the prior mortgage.
Where such an understanding, express or implied, exists,
the law generally allows a subsequent mortgagee to be
subrogated to the rights of a prior mortgage where the
subsequent mortgagee has advanced money to the debtor to
satisfy the prior mortgage, and where the subsequent
mortgagee is not a mere volunteer.
408 P.2d at 846.

The Arizona court cited Martin v.

Hickenlooper, supra, as the leading case on the issue of
equitable subrogation and quoted the following language from
Emmert v. Thompson, 49 Minn. 386, 52 N.W. 31 (1892), which was
also quoted in Martin v. Hickenlooper:
The better opinion now is that one who loans his money
upon real estate security for the express purpose of
taking up or discharging liens and encumbrances on the
same property has thus paid the debt at the instance,
request and solicitation of the debtor, expecting and
believing, in good faith, that his security will, of
record, be substituted, in fact, in place of that which he
discharges, is neither a volunteer, stranger, nor
intermeddler... .
402 2d at 846.

The Arizona court also followed Tracy-Collins
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Trust Company v. Goeltz, supra in establishing the priority of
the bank's security interest vis-a-vis the mechanic's lien.
Southern Colonial Mortgage Company Inc. v. Medeiros, 347
S. 2d 736 (Florida App. 1977) involved a contest as to the
priorities between mortgages and mechanic's liens on a
condominium development.

In March and April of 1974 the

mortgagees had extended two loans to two purchasers of
condominium apartments.

Portions of the loans were paid

directly to the construction lender-mortgagee to secure a
release of the construction mortgage which had been recorded
approximately 18 months earlier on September 13, 1972. A
notice of commencement of work was recorded on May 15, 1973 and
the lienholders recorded their liens in August and November of
1974 and January of 1975.

The purchasers of the condominium

apartments defaulted and the mortgagee commenced foreclosure
joining the lien claimants as defendants.

The trial court held

the lienholders' claims were superior to the mortgages on the
basis that the mechanic's liens related back to and attached as
of the date of the recording of the notice of commencement.

In

reversing, the court of appeals stated:
The mortgagees/appellants next claim they were entitled to
priority by reason of being subrogated to the rights of
the construction mortgage to the extent that the mortgage
was paid by them. The construction mortgage predated the
mechanic's liens and the payments by the appellantmortgagees did pay off in full the construction mortgage
insofar as it encumbered each condominium unit involved.
Continuing, the appeals court said:
This right of subrogation has been recognized in Florida:
"The rule is academic that one who makes a loan to
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discharge a first mortgage, pursuant to an agreement with
the mortgagor that he shall have a first mortgage on the
same lands to secure it, the lendor will be subrogated to
the rights of the first mortgagee, notwithstanding there
is at the same time a second outstanding mortgage of which
he (the lendor) is ignorant." (Citations omitted.)
The equitable result of such rule was further stated by
the Supreme Court:
"The application of this rule works common justice to all;
it prevents injury to the appellant, who furnished the
money to pay off the first mortgage in ignorance of the
second; it gives appellant the benefit of its payment; it
carries out the intention of the parties and leaves ...
the holder of the junior mortgage in his original
position. One of the first tests determining the
application of this rule is whether or not subrogation to
the place of the prior or retired lien puts the holder of
the second lien in any worse position than if the prior
lien had not been discharged." (Citations omitted.)
*

*

*

We agree that an assignment would be the better practice
to insure the successor mortgagee's subrogation rights.
However, under the circumstances of this case and the
equitable principles set out above we do not feel the
failure to secure an assignment prevents subrogation. And
by recognizing the mortgagee's subrogation rights, the
lienholders are not placed in any worse position than if
the construction mortgage had not been released.
347 So.2d at 738-739.
One of the most recent and perhaps most illuminating
decisions addressing equitable subrogation and an intervening
mechanic's lien is Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D.
Blaylock General Contractors, Inc., 576 S.W. 2d 794 (Texas
1978) (See Appendix, Exhibit 4). That case discussed the
relative priority of a mechanic's lien, a vendor's lien, a
construction loan and a loan for the permanent financing
(sometimes referred to as a "take-out loan").

The case

addressed facts in which two motels were constructed on
properties, one each in Fort Worth and Irving, Texas.
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The

doctrine of equitable subrogation was applicable only as to the
Irving, Texas development.
The Irving property was purchased by Dollar Inns of
America (Dollar Inns) for $309,900.00 with funds borrowed from
Palomar Mortgage Investors (Palomar) on April 5, 1973.

This

purchase was pursuant to a Tri-Party Agreement among Dollar
Inns, Palomar and Diversified Mortgage Investors (DMI) which
provided that Palomar would lend funds to Dollar Inns for the
purchase of the property and construction of the motel.

DMI

would pay off Palomar with proceeds from the permanent
financing.

On April 5, 1973, the day Dollar Inns purchased the

property, construction had already begun pursuant to a
construction contract which the general contractor (Blaylock)
had previously entered into with Dollar Inns.

Also on April 5,

1973, the property was subject to a preexisting vendor's lien
held by First Bank and Trust of Richardson.

As part of the

April 5th closing, $109,900.00 of the $309,900.00 borrowed from
Palomar was used to pay off First Bank and Trust of Richardson
and the bank released its vendor's lien one week later on April
12, 1973. Upon completion of construction Palomar assigned its
interest in the deed of trust to DMI. Dollar Inns subsequently
defaulted in payments on the note secured by the deed of trust
and DMI conducted a foreclosure sale under its trust deed on
December 3, 1974.

In the meantime, Blaylock commenced an

action in district court to foreclose its mechanic's lien
naming DMI as a defendant.

In determining the priorities of
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the parties' liens, the Texas Supreme Court stated:
The date of inception of the mechanic's lien preceded both
the execution and recordation of DMI' s deed of trust lien
on the Irving Property; therefore, if there was no other
factor involved, such mechanic's lien would be senior and
superior.
There is an additional factor, however, and that is the
doctrine of equitable subrogation.
576 S.W. 2d 806-807.

The court continued by stating:

We recognize the importance of this doctrine to lenders in
this state. It serves to protect a lienholder from
intervening liens, at least to the amount of the initial
lien, when the lienholder has discharged a prior superior
lien.
576 S.W. 2d 807.

In explaining its ruling the court stated:

To put the matter more clearly, let us suppose that at the
time of closing on the Irving property Dollar Inns had not
purchased and Richardson bank had not sold and released
its vendor's lien. This would result in the Richardson
Bank holding a vendor's lien, Blaylock having a mechanic's
and materialman's lien, and DMI having a deed of trust
lien. Under those circumstances, it could not be doubted
but that the Richardson Bank would hold the senior lien,
superior to both Blaylock's and DMI's liens. That being
the case, it also cannot be [disputed] that DMI stepped
into the shoes of the Richardson Bank, at least to the
extent of the Richardson Bank's lien, by virtue of the
doctrine of equitable subrogation. By foreclosing its
deed of trust lien, DMI foreclosed the preexisting
vendor's lien secured thereby and it may now assert the
priority of the bank's lien.
The result of this holding is that the liens stand in the
following order of priority: (1) the Richardson bank's
vendor's lien in the amount of $109,900.00 to which DMI
was subrogated; (2) Blaylock's mechanic's lien in the
amount of $136,767.00; and (3) the balance due on the
note secured by the deed of trust held by DMI. The
fundamental essence of this holding is that all proceeds
received at the foreclosure sale of December 3, 1974 in
excess of $109,900.00 (the extent of DMI's subrogation)
were excess proceeds. (Emphasis in original.)
576 S.W. 2d at 807.
Subsequent to establishing the priority of the lien, the
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court addressed the further question of the appropriate remedy
in view of the fact that the trust deed had been non-judicially
foreclosed prior to the trial court's decree of foreclosure of
Blaylock's mechanic's lien.

The court elaborated:

Under these circumstances we are squarely faced with the
precise question which this court reserved for judgment in
Irving Lumber Company,, supra: Whether Blaylock may pursue
the excess proceeds of the foreclosure sale. We agree
with the court of civil appeals holding that Blaylock may
pursue the excess proceeds. (Citations omitted). This is
the logical result inasmuch as DMI's right of subrogation
extends only to the amount of the preexisting vendor's
lien.
576 S.W. 2d at 808.
POINT III
THE EQUITIES OF THIS CASE FAVOR APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE
SUBROGATION TO DEFENDANT SECURITY PACIFIC, GRANTING
PRIORITY TO ITS TRUST DEED OVER THE MECHANIC'S LIEN
OF PLAINTIFF
A. Subrogation Effectuates The Expectations Of The
Parties Hereto Without Prejudicing Or Granting A Windfall
To Either Party And Without Affecting The Purpose Of The
Mechanic's Lien Statues.
The instant case presents a very compelling factual
setting for the application of the doctrine of equitable
subrogation.

The loan was requested by defendant Youngman for

the purpose of paying off existing encumbrances against her
property and she expressly agreed that Ameristar would have a
first lien to secure the loan to her.

(Record at 100, 151,

213, 214, 215). There was a further representation under oath
by defendant Youngman that she had not caused or created any
other encumbrances against the property.

(Record at 100, 151,

214, 215). Ameristar clearly bargained for a first position
lien against the property and paid $303,545.95 to satisfy the
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prior encumbrances.

Defendant Security Pacific succeeded to

the interest of Ameristar by assignment dated October 15,
1988.

(Record at 102). Diversified Mortgage Investors v.

Lloyd D. Blaylock General Contractors, Inc., supra, at 806-807.
On the other hand, there is no evidence that plaintiff
bargained for any security for the payment of labor and
materials supplied by him other than that provided by law.

His

interest was clearly junior to the encumbrances which were
against the property at the time he commenced supplying
painting labor and materials thereto.
knowledge of those encumbrances.

He is charged with

Utah Code Annotated Section

57-3-2; Capital Lumbering Co. v. Ryan, 34 Or. 73, 54 P. 1094,
(1894).

Plaintiff did not change his position in reliance on

those liens being satisfied.

(Record at 250). By subrogating

defendant Security Pacific to the lien priority of the
encumbrances paid from the loan proceeds, to the extent of
those payments of $303,545.95, plaintiff is in no worse
position than had defendant Youngman not refinanced those
existing obligations.
The facts of this case fall squarely within the holding of
Martin v. Hickenlooper, supra.

There was a clear, express

agreement on the part of defendant Youngman that Ameristar
would have security equal to that of the liens which were
satisfied by its loan proceeds.

Martin v. Hickenlooper held as

follows:
Suffice it to say that where there is a promise on the
part of the mortgagor or his transferee, given to one who
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pays money to pay off a lien, that such lender will be in
equally as good position as regards security as the lien
holder whose lien his money was intended to discharge and
did discharge. [sic] He will be considered in equity as
an assignee of the lien and especially where assurances
are given him that his lien will be or is a first lien.
59 P.2d at 1152.
Equity should apply subrogation in this case, not in
derogation of the mechanic's lien statutes, but in light of
them.

Those who supply labor and materials to improve real

property are granted by statute a lien against the property so
improved to the extent they are not paid for their labor and
materials.

Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-1 et seq.

The

unique feature of the mechanic's lien statutes is that the lien
attaches as of the commencement of the improvement to the
property and not when a notice of lien is recorded in the
county recorder's office.

Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-5.

Consequently, those who perform the finishing touches to the
project are given the same priority as those who begin a
project by excavation or otherwise.
38-1-10.

Utah Code Annotated

However, once the priority date is established, a

mechanic's lien claimant is not accorded a favored status over
any other type of lien claimant.

He has no greater equity than

a judgment lienholder, a mortgagee, a trust deed beneficiary or
a vendor.
In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff's mechanic's
lien attached subsequent to the recordation of the existing
obligations against defendant Youngman's property, and prior to
the recordation of the trust deed in favor of Ameristar.
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However, because equity, under Martin v. Hickenlooper, treats
the payment by Ameristar of the existing obligations as an
assignment of the liens so paid, the trust deed of Ameristar
(which was later assigned to defendant Security Pacific) is
deemed to have attached not at the time it was recorded, but as
of the recording date of the liens it paid.

Consequently, the

provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-5 are not
defeated by the application of equitable subrogation.
B. The Undisputed Facts Herein Show A Clear Express
Agreement Calling For Subrogation Coupled With An Absence
Of Culpable Negligence On The Part Of Defendant Security
Pacific And Its Predecessor-In-Interest
There is no evidence in this case which would suggest that
equity should stay its hand in subrogating defendant Security
Pacific to the prior encumbrances.

There is no hint of fraud

or wrongdoing on the part of Ameristar or defendant Security
Pacific and neither Ameristar nor defendant Security Pacific is
guilty of culpable negligence.

Plaintiff's mechanic's lien was

not recorded until November 16, 1988, after both the
recordation of the Ameristar trust deed on July 7, 1988 and its
assignment to defendant Security Pacific on October 15, 1988.
Furthermore, one of the conclusions drawn by the court in
Martin v. Hickenlooper, supra, is that the clearer the
agreement of subrogation or the assurances of a first lien, the
less important the lender's negligence, if any, becomes.

In

American Law of Property, Section 16.151, page 353, the authors
make the following observation:
In passing it may be worth remark that if the basis for
subrogation really is contractual it would be puzzling to
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understand why carelessness or notice should be thought to
have any part whatsoever. "If subrogation depends upon an
implied or express agreement to subrogate, what boots it
whether or no [sic] the lender had notice of subsequent
liens?" (Quoting Martin v. Hickenlooper, supra, at 1143).
In Capital Lumbering Co. v. Ryan, supra, the court
observed that if a lender is ignorant of a recorded intervening
lien, and yet is entitled to equitable relief, the right to
such relief is even more meritorious if the intervening lien is
a mechanic's lien which was unrecorded at the time the loan was
given.

In that regard the court stated:

...the [mechanic's] lien of plaintiff had not been filed,
nor had Ryan [the owner] made default in his payments;
and, this being so, it would be carrying the doctrine
further than any adjudged case of which we have knowledge
to \. Id that the defendant Noble [lender] is not entitled
to i.ave his lien restored to the position of the original
mortgage as against the plaintiff's lien, simply because
he knew the building was then in process of construction
and uncompleted, and especially so when such restoration
does not interfere with any superior equity.
45 P. at 1095.
In this case, there is no evidence of notice to Ameristar
of the painting labor performed by plaintiff.

There is no

evidence in the record to the effect that a person inspecting
the property at the time Ameristar?s trust deed went of record
would have been on notice that an improvement to the property
was underway.

But even if such would have been the case, that

fact would not bar the application of equitable subrogation.
As noted by the court in Jackson Trust Company v.
Gilkinson, supra, the fact that the lender could have inspected
the property and ascertained that a garage was in the course of
construction (possibly giving rise to a mechanic's lien claim),
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but failed to do so, such failure did not constitute
inexcusable or culpable negligence such as to bar the
application of equitable subrogation.

The court held as

follows in that case:
If the complainant had caused an inspection to be made of
the mortgaged premises, it would readily have ascertained
that the aforesaid garage was in course of erection, and
thus be put upon notice of inquiry respecting such right
as the building contractor may have claimed by way of
mechanic's lien, but complainant's neglect in the this
respect cannot operate as a bar to the equitable relief
sought herein, particularly for the reason that Bahr, the
mechanic's lien claimant, is not in anywise injured
thereby.
147 A. at 115.
The concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe in Federal Land
Bank of Berkeley v. Salt Lake Valley Sand & Gravel Company, 96
Utah 359, 85 P.2d 791, 793 (1939), is instructive on the degree
of negligence necessary to stay equitable relief:
In Martin v. Hlckenlooper, 90 Utah 150, 50 P.2d 1139, we
considered the authorities which more and more show a
development toward not permitting a windfall to one person
because of the mere negligence of another where he has not
been injured by the negligence. It requires gross
negligence before another may fortuitously and vicariously
benefit by that negligence.
The evidence in this case clearly shows that neither
Ameristar nor Security Pacific was guilty of negligence or
other conduct which would preclude the application of equitable
subrogation.
POINT IV
SUBROGATION ACCOMPLISHES SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN THIS CASE
BY ACCORDING PRIORITY TO THE DEED OF TRUST OF DEFENDANT
SECURITY PACIFIC ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF THE FUNDS
ADVANCED TO PAY EXISTING OBLIGATIONS.
The subrogation of defendant Security Pacific to the
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position of the encumbrances paid by the loan proceeds from
Ameristar gives defendant Security Pacific a first position
lien against the subject property to the extent of $303,545.95,
plaintiff's mechanic's lien a second position and Security
Pacific a third position in the amount of $16,454.05
($320,000.00 - $303,545.95).

As noted in Tracy-Collins Trust

Company v. Goeltz, supra, where the amount subrogated is less
than the total funds advanced by the person paying off the
earlier lien, the lender is subrogated to the amount of the
prior encumbrances paid with the intervening lien claimant
taking a second position to that amount.

In that case, the

funds advanced totaled $7,100.00, but the first mortgage
extinguished by those funds was $3,224.41.

The court stated

the rationale for this result as follows:
Appellant is in no worse position than had respondent
taken an assignment of the 1936 mortgage from Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Company and a second mortgage for
the additional amount of approximately $3,900.00.
Consequently, the court held that the lender had a first
position lien to the extent of $3,224.41 and subjected the fee
title of Mrs. Goeltz to that amount.

Only the interest of Mr.

Goeltz was subject to the balance of the loan proceeds of
$7,100.00.
In Peterman-Donnelly Engineers and Contractors Corp. v.
First National Bank of Arizona, Phoenix, supra, the court
followed Tracy-Collins Trust Company v. Goeltz in holding that
the lender was in a first position to the extent of the first
mortgage paid of $11,600.00, the mechanic's lien claimant then
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held a second position and the balance of the $35,000.00 loan
($35,000 - $11,600) was relegated to a third position behind
the mechanic's lien claimant.
An additional factor in the present case is that the
subject property was sold at a trustee's sale in July 1990
pursuant to the terms of the trust deed given to Ameristar.

A

similar fact situation was presented in Diversified Mortgage
Investors v. Lloyd D. Blaylock General Contractor, Inc., supra,
except that in that case the successful credit bid of the trust
deed beneficiary at the sale was greater than the amount to
which the lender was subrogated.

The court allocated the

proceeds of the trustee's sale as follows:
In summary, ... DMI's deed of trust lien is senior and
superior to Blaylock's mechanic's lien only to the extent
of the Richardson bank's preexisting vendor's lien in the
sum of $109,900.00. Beyond that amount, Blaylock has a
valid and subsisting lien in the amount of $136,767;
however, the sale by the trustee under the deed of trust
transferred the land itself free of all liens; therefore,
Blaylock's security interest is transferred to the excess
proceeds from the sale, which stand in the place of the
property and may be reached by Blaylock. Whatever remains
thereafter goes to DMI on the balance due on the note.
Since DMI bid in the land at its own foreclosure sale, no
cash actually changed hands. Instead, DMI took title to
the land in cancellation of part of the loan.
Consequently, we are of the opinion that the court of
civil appeals correctly determined that Blaylock's proper
remedy was in the form of a money judgment against DMI for
the unpaid amount of its lien on the Irving property.
576 S.W. 2d at 808.
In the present case, the amount bid at the trustee's sale
was less than the amount to which defendant Security Pacific
was subrogated.

(Record at 248). Accordingly, there are no

excess proceeds from the trustee's sale to which the mechanic's
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lien of plaintiff may attach.

The trustee's sale extinguished

the lien of plaintiff and an unencumbered fee title became
vested in Security Pacific after the trustee's sale.
The summary judgment entered by the trial court should be
reversed, the trust deed of defendant Security Pacific should
be subrogated in the amount of $303,545.95 to the position of
the prior encumbrances, the mechanic's lien of plaintiff should
be held junior to that amount, and the balance of the loan
proceeds from Ameristar should be held to be in a third
position.

As a result of the trustee's sale, defendant

Security Pacific became the fee title holder of the subject
property and the mechanic's lien of plaintiff was
extinguished.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, defendant Security Pacific
respectfully requests that the court reverse the summary
judgment entered by the trial court, that judgment be entered
in favor of defendant Security Pacific subrogating its trust
deed to the amount of the prior liens paid from its loan
proceeds, totaling $303,545.95, that the mechanic's lien of
plaintiff be held junior to that amount, and that the
mechanic's lien of plaintiff be held extinguished as a result
of the trustee's sale in July 1990.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT SECURITY PACIFIC BANK to the
following on March £—, 1992, postage prepaid, addressed as
follows:
Ralph R. Tate
Attorney for Plaintiff
4685 Highland Drive, #202
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
SHERMAN C. YOUNG
youngman/c/1-5 0
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APPENDIX

Exhibit 1

J . Lamar R i c h a r d s v . S e c u r i t y P a c i f i c N a t i o n a l Bank
Supreme Court No. 910547
Dates
Executed
(Recorded)
JENTZCH

Chain of T i t l e
and
Conveyances
BUNCE

Q.C.D.
W.D.
#4078401
#4078402
3/20/85
4/18/85
(4/25/85)
->ZSCHEILE<
3/01/85
(4/25/85)

Beneficiary
or
Vendor

Encumbrances,
Security
Interests, etc.
JENSEN
W.D.
#4078403
4/22/85

$86,414.00

T r u s t Deed
-#4078404

->

4/22/85
(4/25/85)

Trust Deed
-#4078405

>

TAL

4/22/85
(4/25/85)

Trust Deed
-#4078406

>

JENSEN

Trust Deed
-#4078408

>

ZSCHEILE

BUNCE

<-

$1,615.95

$10,000.00

ZSCHEILE
4/22/85
(4/25/85)

W.D.
#4078407

4/15/85
(4/25/85)

LAFAYETTE
PROPERTIES
INC,

4/15/85

LAFAYETTE
PROPERTIES
INC.

I

$151,970.00

Vendors Sec.
Int. in
-U.R.E.C.
>

<

LAFAYETTE
PROPERTIES <
INC.

$53,54 6.00

Vendee's Int.
in U.R.E.C.
YOUNC3MAN
6/28/88

^

Work Commences

(6/29/88)

<

U.R.E. Contract Recorded

7/01/88
(7/07/88)

(7/22/88)

YOUN(3MAN

Trust Deed
#4647262
>
$320,000.00

$303,545.95
AMERISTAR

Reconveyance of Bunce, Tal,
Jensen and Zscheile Trust Deeds

Exhibit 2

Martin v. Hickenlooper
90 U t a h 1 5 0 , 59 P . 2 d 1 1 3 9

Dates

Chain of T i t l e
and
Conveyances

Encumbrances,
Security
Interests, etc.

(1936)

Mortgagee

Mortgage
2/01/21

6/18/21

6/20/21

2/24/22

Stovens
I

> State of Utah <
$3,500.00

Deed

I
Hickenlooper
I

Mortgage
> Martin
$2,500.00

Deed
Mortgage

6/01/27

Fritsch Loan

> Zorn
$3,500.00

$

Exhibit 3

Jackson Trust Company v. Gilkinson
147 A. 113 (N.J. Eq. 1929)

Dates

Chain of T i t l e
and
Conveyances

Encumbrances,
Security
Interests, etc.

Mortgagee
or
Lien Claimant

Mortgage
Gilkinson

>

G r e e n v i l l e H e i g h t s B.& L.A.

<-

Contract entered
3/34/27

<

John Bahr
Work Commenced
Mortgage

5/05/27

Gilkinson

> Jackson Trust Company $7,977.04
$8,500.00

Exhibit 4

D i v e r s i f i e d Mortcracre I n v e s t o r s v , Lloyd P.
Blaylock General Contractors Inc.
576 S.W.2d 794 (Texas 1978)

Dates

Chain of T i t l e
and
Conveyances

Unnamed
Vendee

Encumbrances,
Security
Interests, etc.

Beneficiary,
Lien Claimant,
Vendor

V e n d o r s Lien
-> Richardson Bank

Work Commences
Blaylock Contractors

4/05/73

Unnamed
Vendee

4/05/73

Deed

4/05/73
(4/13/73)

Dollar
Inns

I

2/05/74

Trust Deed
-> Palomar $109,000.00

Assignment
of
Trust Deed

Diversified Mortgage
Investors

Exhibit 5

HIED

DtsmtiT count

Third Judicial District

DEC 0 2 1991
SHERMAN C. YOUNG (3891)
JERRY L. REYNOLDS (2728)
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendant, Security
Pacific National Bank
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: (801) 375-3000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

Deputy C M *

STATE OF UTAH
J. LAMAR RICHARDS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DEBRA L.YOUNGMAN & et a L ,
Defendant.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
AS AGAINST DEFENDANT
DIAMANTI
Civil No 890904949CN
Hon.

Pat B. Brian

Based upon the Stipulation of the parties and for good
cause shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed as against defendant
Deborah Diamanti, without prejuedice, each party to bear their

-

J

=£*_

Approved as to Form
t
Ralph R. Tate Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff, Lamar Richards
youngman.ord.1

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order of Dismissal As Against Defendant Diamanti
to the following on November 3^>
1991, postage prepaid,
addressed as follows:
Ralph R. Tate
Attorney for Plaintiff
4685 Highland Drive, #202
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
Larry G. Reed
Attorney at Law
455 South 300 East, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Deborah Diamanti
225 N. Main, #101
Salt Lake City, UT

84103

SHERMAN
youngman/1

-A-oJLi

•

'

v.

l

.

T h . i O ' «i

AUG 2 0 1931

RALPH R. TATE, JR.

(#3192)

VJ

Attorney for Plaintiff
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: 278-4747
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

J. LAMAR RICHARDS,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
AMENDMENT TO JUDGMENT
AND DECREE OF FORECLOSURE DATED 5-8-90

DEBRA L. YOUNGMAN, et al.,

Civil No. 890904949CN
Hon. Pat B. Brian

vs.

Defendant.

This matter came before the court on motions for summary
judgment filed by plaintiff and defendant Security Pacific National
Bank, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
The issue presented for decision was the relative priority of
plaintiff's mechanic's lien and defendant Security Pacific's trust
deed.
granted

After consideration of the parties' briefs, the court
plaintiff's

motion

for

summary

judgment

and

denied

defendant Security Pacific's motion for summary judgment as set
forth by separate order.

Pursuant to the court's rulings, it is

hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure dated May 8,

1990, is reinstated and amended to add the following provisions.

^

—' " T *

V-J

All other aspects of the May 8, 1990, judgment are unchanged. The
Amended Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure dated May 22, 1991, is
hereby vacated and superceded by this Judgment.
2.

Plaintiff's mechanic's lien recorded on November 16,

1988, as Entry No. 4702325 in Book 6081 at Page 2039 in the
official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder is a valid and
perfected lien upon the following described property:
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 1,
Block 27, Plat "G", Salt Lake City Survey, and
running thence West 135 feet; thence North 13 0
feet; thence East 135 feet; thence South 13 0
feet to the point of beginning.
3.

It is further ordered and decreed that the interests

in the above property of defendant Security Pacific National Bank
and First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. as shown by assignments
recorded May 10, 1989, arising from a trust deed in favor of
Ameristar Financial Corp. recorded on July 7, 1988, as Entry No.
4647262 in Book 6045 at Page 980 in the official records of the
Salt

Lake

County

Recorder

are

inferior

and

subordinate

to

plaintiff's mechanic's lien recorded November 16, 1986.
4.

The judgment for attorney's fees heretofore entered

on May 8, 1990, is augmented to add an additional avrard of
attorney's fees incurred between the May 8, 1990, judgment and June
17, 1991, in the sum of $2,420.00.
DATED this g 0

J7

/7

Approved as tcj ztorlril) ^
Sherman C. Young

day of August 1991.

Jtfdge

010

to

AUG 2 0 £31
Q

RALPH R. TATE, JR. (#3192)
Attorney for Plaintiff
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: 278-4747

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
J. LAMAR RICHARDS,

)

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

)

DEBRA L. YOUNGMAN, DEBORAH
:
DIAMANTI, AKERISTAR FINANCIAL
CORPORATION, a corporation,
)
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES
COMPANY, INC., a corporation,
:
SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK,
FIRST BOSTON MORTGAGE SECURITIES)
CORP., and JOHN DOES 1-3,
•

Defendants.

<?<\C5 O ^ ^

ORDER PURSUANT TO:

1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
2. DEFENDANT SECURITY
PACIFIC'S CROSS MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
3. DEFENDANT SECURITY
PACIFIC'S MOTION TO
STRIKE
Civil No. 890904949CN
Hon. Pat B. Brian

This matter came before the court on motions for summary
judgment filed by plaintiff and defendant Security Pacific National
Bank.

Defendant Security Pacific filed a motion to strike certain

allegations of plaintiff.

All motions were fully briefed and the

matter was submitted to the court pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code
of Judicial Administration.
The court having been fully advised in the premises,
there appearing to be no disputed issues of material fact, finds
and concludes as follows:
1. Plaintiff commenced his work on the subject property

X'ZIO

2
prior to June 29, 1988, and completed his work on August 30, 1988.
2. Plaintiff's notice of mechanic's lien was recorded on
November 16, 1988.
3 . A Deed of Trust from defendant Youngman to Ar.eristar
Financial

Corporation

was

recorded

July

7,

1988.

It

was

subsequently assigned to First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. on
October 15, 1988. The assignment was recorded May 10, 1989. First
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. assigned its Deed of Trust to
defendant Security Pacific. This Assignment was also recorded May
10, 1989. As of May 10, 1989, all interests of Ameristar Financial
Corporation and First Boston Mortgage were vested in defendant
Security Pacific National Bank.
4.

Based upon the undisputed

facts of record and

equities between the parties, the court concludes that the doctrine
of equitable subrogation as claimed by defendant Security Pacific
is not applicable in this case.
5.

Defendant

Security

Pacific's motion

to strike

references to title insurance and paragraphs 1 and 2 of plaintiff's
Additional Significant Facts in plaintiff's Reply Memorandum is
hereby granted.
6.

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted.

7. Defendant Security Pacific's cross motion for summary
judgment is denied.

3
8.

An

amendment

to

the

judgment

and

decree

of

foreclosure shall be entered incorporating the elements of this
order as they apply to the decree of foreclosure and awarding
plaintiff such additional attorneys fees as shall be established in
accordance with Rule 4-505 of the Code of Judicial Administration.
9.

The order heretofore signed by this court Kay 22,

1991, entitled "Order on Summary Judgments and Motion to Strike"
and the "Arended Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure" are hereby
vacated and superceded by this order and the Amendment to Judgment
filed herewith.
10.

of fact as set forth in the parties1

statements
support

Except as qualified herein, the other undisputed

of

their

respective

motions

for summary

Memoranda in
judgment are

incorporated by reference as findings of fact by this court.
11.

It is further ordered that defendant's Motion for

Stay of Execution pending the issuance of this Amended Order is
denied for the reason that said issue is now moot.
DATED this .y[_> day of August 1991.
BY THE COURT:

Judge
ApprcSy^d a s

^?

t

Sherman C. Young
°-VTJ*

RALPH R. TATE, JR., P.C. (#3192)
Attorney for Plaintiff
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: 278-4747
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

J. LAMAR RICHARDS,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE
OF FORECLOSURE

vs.
Civil No. 890904949CN
Hon. Pat B. Brian

DEBRA L. YOUNGMAN, DEBORAH
DIAMANTI, AMERISTAR FINANCIAL
CORPORATION, a corporation, and
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES
COMPANY, INC., a corporation,
and JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants.

The above matter came before the court under the
provisions
Judgment.

of

Rule

4-501

on plaintiff's

Motion

for Summary

The action was brought by plaintiff seeking in part a

decree of foreclosure with respect to the property which is subject
matter of this litigation arising out of a mechanic's lien for
services rendered by plaintiff on the property.

All parties have

been properly served and the default of defendants Ameristar
Financial Corporation and Associates Financial Services Company,
Inc. have heretofore been entered.

Defendant Diamanti has denied

having any interest in the real property which is subject matter of
the

foreclosure

proceeding.

The

issues

of

the

financial

responsibility of defendant Diamanti for any of the obligations
have been reserved for further proceedings if necessary.
The matter came before the court on plaintiff's Motion

2
for Summary Judgment, for entry of judgment as against defendant
Debra L. Youngman, and for entry of a decree of foreclosure as
against

all

parties, reserving

certain

issues

pertaining

to

defendant Diamanti.
The court having considered the papers submitted by the
parties, including the Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting
Memorandum,

and

the Affidavits

counsel, being duly advised

of plaintiff

and

plaintiff's

in the circumstances, good cause

appearing therefore, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as
follows:
1.

Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff

and against defendant Debra L. Youngman for $5,499.50 representing
the amount due

for services rendered

subject to plaintiff's

mechanic's lien; $893.67 representing unpaid interest through April
15, 1990; plaintiff's court costs to date in the sum of $108.75;
plaintiff's attorney's fees to date in the sum of $780.00, for a
total judgment of $7,281.92 together with after-accruing interest
at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of judgment until paid
and plaintiff's court costs incurred hereafter.

It is further

ORDERED that this judgment shall be augmented by the amount of
reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collection by
foreclosure, execution, or otherwise as shall be established by
affidavit.
2. The foregoing indebtedness arises from a mechanic's
lien which

constitutes a valid

following described real property:

and perfected

lien upon the

3
Commei ici :r i< j at tl le Soi i tl least cor i ler of Lot
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thence North 13 0 feet; thence East 135
feet; thence South 130 feet to the point
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NOTICE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
ent and Decree of Foreclosure, postage prepaid, thjs
day
i "I 1990, addressed as follows:
Debra Youngman
c/o Club Karerra
3424 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

Deborah Diamanti
225 North Main #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103

Debra Youngman
983 East 3rd Avenue?
Salt Lake City, Ut.tl, HJIu1

Larry G. Reed, Esq.
CROWTHER, BEARD & SHAPHREN
455 South 300 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Ameristar Financial Corp.
c/o C.T. Corporation
50 West 300 South, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Associates Financial Services
c/o Prentice Hall
185 South State #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

c?.

IX

Ralph R. Tate, J r.

••-076

I. " I I I I H I

(i

ifr.invA •

itjzayo|».w -are ly-jg™.79^

FOR
Pr«ptym«nt Option
ymtnt Option

No Prepayment P e n a l t y -

' ^
^ ^

(%£*y
t 2 ^ ^ '

{Hazard Int.]

| Mtp Ins | 1

Regulcfr FNMA/FHLI

I Property Streat Address

983 e .

esj

gf>*\rf '

City

T h i r d Ave.

1 County

'Stale

S a l t Lake

S a l t Lake

I Leftal Description TXttach Wlcriplion Tt n¥eaeaary]

Zip

84 10 3

Ut .

commence at the Southeast corner Lot 1 Block 27 Plat G

OSS-

Purpose of Loan
\ [Purchase
| 1 Construction-Permanent [ ]Construction
[ jjRefinance
| )Other (Explain)
Complete this line
Original Cost
Present Value (a) jCosl of Imps (b) J
Total {a + b}
Lot Value Data
Construction-Permanent
Year Acquired
s
:$
;$
or Construction Loan tm
Complete this tine If a Refinance Loan

_Purpo»e of Refinance

Year Acquired [Original Cost \Amt Existing Liens

1985

;,420,00(fc 303,546

;M o

r

tgage

Describe: Improvements f
c o n S 0 1 i d3 t«i on

[Lower i n t e r e s t

J made

|

] to be ma.3>e

rate!

I M a n n c In WMrt- f»tie Will Be Held

I Title Will Be Held In What Name(s)

Debra L. Youngman

'A

singlf

Woman

I Source of Down Payment and Settlement Charges

Loan proceeds
This application Is designed to be completed by the borrower(s) with the lender's assistance The Co-Borrower Section and all other Co-Borrower questions mjs DC
completed and the appropriate box(es) checked if

another person will be Jointly obligated with the Borrower on the loan or

the Borrower is relying o*

from alimony, child support or separate maintenance or on the income or assets of another person as a basis for repayment of the loan, or' L
ried and resides, or the property is located, in a community property state

I the Bo'jrrowe- e m-

Co-Borrower
Name

Debra L. Youngman
Present Address

School

33

Yrs 1 6

ED0*1"'

No Years

Street 9 8 3 E . T h i r d
Ctty/staie/z.p S a l t L a k e

Age

Ave

Ag*
Present Address

["""") Rent

I

I Own

Q>,~.

Street

C i t y ,

U t 84103

Ctty/'State/Zip

I on 1 ier address it less than 2 years at present address

Former address if less than 2 years at present address

S t r ei e t

Street
City/State/Zip

City /State/Zip
I

Years at former address

JQwn

H=-'iti-Color

_A

n/a

Years on this job

Director,Utah Division
Social Security Number"*
i><;

Marital [ ^ M a r r i e d

Base Empl Income

$11,500

[Separated

I Own

..H"^"}?'"!'

. ('net single divorced

Years empk>ve>:* r tmr
ot work or processor
yeaYears on thrs p :
1 j Self E m p c n
Type of Business

Social Security Number***

Monthly Housing Expense"

Co-Borrower

Total

$ 11,500

$

MttSENl

Rent
First Mortgage ( M l )

Overtime

Other Financing (P&l)

Bonuses

Hazard Insurance

Commissions

Real Estate Taxes

Dividends/Interest

Mortgage Insurance

Net Rental Income

Homeowners Assn Dues

Othert (B*tor«

Other:

eompleitnc a * * nonet

Home Phone

Business Pro".

Utilities

$11,500

$

Total

2,083
83
271

WIO«"OSCC

1

Details of Purchase
I}/}

Do Not Complete If Refinance

L2574^] %

a

jrchase Price

S

b ToU' Ctosino Costs (Est)

( J 7 \ fi 0 - A 0 P^epawJ Escrows (Est)

f rUjLSu.Oft^la 4 ^ c )
e Amount This Mortgage

m
*\

I

s

Other Financing

Hfjffc Other Equity

Total Monthly Pmt

Ineoma baiow )

$11,500

\
.

915-573-0236

Gross Monthly Income
Borrower

1 , ,

Position/Title

Business Phone ,

363-8503

Hem

I

Advertising

Home Phone

524-82-5294

.

4

11 I Sett Employed'
Type of Business

•, T i t l e

j

Years at lor me r address

Status 1 I Unmarried ,
Years employed in this line Name and Address of Employer
jol work or profession?
1Q
years

Advertising

O. Box 64 5
d e r , Texas

J I Rent
«lgT[P»TCQ+OWOWf»

Marital | 1 Married
f H Separated
_
r r n ..
- ^ (,ncl •"*9t« divorced
Status | X I Unmarried widowd)
Name and Address of Employer

Total

Sr-oo:

$ 2 , 4 3 7 L 3 1 0 4 . 1 0) Amount of Cash Deposit
400
400 i Closing Costs Paid by Seller
$ 2 , 8 3 7 $ 3,074 j Cash Reqd For Closing (Est) s

Describe Other Income

o

B—Borrower

C—Co-Borrower

NOTICE

Alimony child support, or separate maintenance income need not be revealed it the
Borrower or Co-Borrower does not choose to have It considered as a basis tor repaying this loan

If Employed In Current Position For Less Than Two Years. Complete the Following
Previous Employer/School

City/State

Type of Business

Position/Title

Dates From/To

These Questions Apply To Both Borrower and Co-Borrower
T M W N O

Are there any outstanding )ucJg>'n#rtts against , r'
("to win you been declared bankrupt within the pas I 7 years'?

tjlTe* or M

no
no
Ara yo» • U.S ettar i":i"

H a w you had property foreclosed upon or 91 van trite w deed in ecu thereat hi
last 7 years?
Are you a party to a law autr?
Art you obligated to pay alimony, child support 01 sei

• - maini

• " n o , " a r a you • tea idem aben?

Jl<2
lie

It any pari ot the down payment borrewtd*'1

I1Q

Are you a co-maker or endorser on • note'

lie

i _i

M "no," a r a v o u a n e r w a a M a m alien?

Explain Otnei Financing w Othaf l-ciony (If any)

fHLMC/FNMA raqulra business cradit raport. signed Federal Income Tax returns tor last two years, and. M available audited Profit and Loss Statement plus balance sheei lor same p* .
"All Present Monthly Mousing Expenses ot Borrower and Co-Borrower should be listed on a combined basis
—* M *-»
"•Optional lor FMLMC
" ;{ ' ^ » * | *£,
fMiMr. 65 nrv 10/BC AT F o - - - ir-j Worms Inc.. 315 Whitney Ave.. New Haven. CT 06511 Atl Rights Reserved 1(800> 243-4545
lt-m I1 231650 PSnmT- W.--T™ -

This fcassmant and f r y applicante supporting achaduiea may be oonyieiso |otnoy py ooen fnamac and unmarried co-oorrowefi • ssew aasaej and
t»jlt»c»»nlryp)inedaolriatf»o8i^^
(FHLMC t&A/FNMA K t t A ) If me co-borrower section was composed eoout a spouse

otiai wise sspareta 8urtomens>aad ftchsdutoa
etasernent and supporting schedutos a v a l
|

| Completed Jointly

( " ^ No* Completed

Liabilities and Pledged Assets

List any additional names under which credit has previously been received

AGREEMENT

The undersigned sppltestorthe loan indicated in this application to be secured by s trst mortgage or deed of trust on the property described N

represents that me property will not be usedtorany illegal or restricted purpose and that all statements made in this application are true and are madetora** p
obtaining t i e loan Verification may be obtained from any source named in this application The original or a copy of this applies bon will be retained by the iende- <
loan is not granted The undersigned [x\ intend or
I

Q ] do not intend to occupy the property as ttieir primary residence

|/we fully understand that it is a tederst crime punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both to knowingly make any false statements concerning any of Wm
pltoaMe under the provisions
of Title 16 United States Code Section 1014
f a c t o r * applicable
provii

\-

~w*r*<?Zrra*x

Bcffffwer s Signature

&•»• 6 / 1 3 / 8 8

_

—
Co-Borrower s Signsture

Information for Government Monitoring Purposes

I'O Be Completed by Interviewer
T M s apple all on was taken a y
f x l face so face interview
\

| by mail

JflVW'{UM^

J Affidavit ana Agreement
(by iorto»»r tntf •topfcrty *#tt#r)
-JftJLtt

*•

»»-ii

,
•ivwafaHto DM arferr*)

COUMTY

nr

) ss

SALT LAKE
»lw»«fOa«rtir

»m*c)

K I W PL J JU<SFN

Before ma,

- a notary public In i

THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE. STATE OF DTAR
ftEBRA L. TOUNCMAN
(referred to herein, whether one or more persons, as "Borrower Affiant"), a n d .

(referred to herein, whether one or more persons, as "Seller Affiant"), and each such person, being of lawful age and being don i
according to law, upon oath deposes and makes the applicable statements contained In Section III below, and Borrower Affiant are: :
Affiant also agree as provided In Section II below
I.

REPRESENTATIONS:
Representation No. 1 . That Borrower Affiant Is the party named In a promissory note (referred to herein as the "Note"; a
mortgage, deed of trust, or deed to secure debt (referred to herein as the "Security Instrument"), both bearing date o * .
JULY 0 1 f 1QBB
, evidencing and eecuring a loan (referred to herein as the "Loan") constituting a ae*- or -

property located at

Q83 E 3RD AVE . SALT LAKE CITY. UT 8*103

(Property Address) (referred to herein as the "Property"), the Loan having been made to Borrower Affiant

li

aMEBTCTan FTHAHCIAL CORPORATION. A CORPORATION. I T S SUCCESSORS AND/OR ASSIGNS
(referred to herein as the "I
Representation No. 2 . That Seller Affiant It the seller of the Property to Borrower Affiant
Representation No. 3. That the purpose of the Loan Is as shown by X In the appropriate space below
D

to finance Borrower Affiant's purchase of the Property, at a purchase price of $

LXK to refinance outstanding debt against the Property
D

for the following purpose

Representation No. 4. That the financial terms of the transaction constituting or related to the Loan are as follows
Amount of the First Mortgage on the Property

$

320.000.00

Cash Equity (if the Loan Is not a refinancing)

$

.00

Purchase Price of the Property
Initial Monthly Payment under the Note

$.
$

2.57M.00

There Is no subordinate financing relating to the Property except as specifically set forth immediately below
Terms of Subordinate Financing
Amount $
Interest Rate
Monthly Payment $

_Ofl
,nnn

%t>

Term

months

JLQ

Name and address of the holder of such subordinate financing

Representation No. 5. That Borrower Affiant has not given, conveyed, permitted, or contracted for, or tareed to give
permit any lien upon the Property to secure a debt or loan, except for any lien connected with subordinate f i n a n c e
Property, as fully disclosed In Representation No 4 above, and the Hen referred to In Representation No 1 above
Representation No. • That If the Loan Is for the purpose of financing Borrower Affiant's purchase of the Property, no i
charges relating to, or In connection with, Borrower Affiant's purchase of the Property, such as Interest charges, real e
hazard insurance premiums, in Mai mortgage Insurance premiums, or of funds to be used for renewal of mortgage i
relation to the Loan, have been, or will be, paid, funded, or borne by Seller Affiant for or on behalf of Borrower Afftani
otherwise specifically stated immediately below
Representation No. 7. As indicated by X In the appropriate apace adjacent to A or B below
That (if indicated by X In the appropriate space adjacent hereto) Borrower Affiant now occupies the Property as
Affiant's principal residence, or In good fattn will so occupy tne rroperty, commencing sucn occupancy not late- r « r thirty (30) days after this date or (b) thirty (30) days after the Property shall first have become ready for occupant -m
habitable dwelling, whichever Is later
D

B That (rf Indicated by X In the appropriate apace adjacent hereto) Borrower Affiant does not occupy the Propmrr
Borrower Affiant's principal residence and does not Intend to do so.

Initials of Borrower Affiant

Initials of Seller Affiant:

>

o i

_

LOAIl * 6772112
•MTIK-1 ram

OMG . - c v p m . cuuftr - • _ » M - M , OOUKNRO.

jam—»

«--»—t—~**.

A. Follower Covenant. 6om - x Affiant agrees thai (If an X la placed m the a ^ 'data apace adjacent to Representation Nc - #
Of Btctioh I above) (1) K shall i* an additional covenant of the Security httrurr^nt thai Borrower/Amant occupy the proper mm
provided In iiioh Representation Mo 7A, and (2) failure to ao occupy the property ahat! oonttitute l breach of covenant unor ~ie»
fcecUHty Inttrumertt thai anal! erttrtie tha Lender, at auccaaaort and aasigns, Id atercJes (ha remedies tor i breach of oovanaar
a V a r i M In lha iaearfty aiaframaht,
B. Inducement Agreement Borrower Affiant and Seller Affiant agree and acknowledge that the foregoing Borrower Covenant <r
applicable), the Rapraaentationa made In Section I above, and the Statements under Oath made In Section III below are made tear
the purpoae of Inducing the Lander and Its assigns to make or purchase the Loan
STATEMENTS UNDER OATH
A. By Borrower Affiant. Borrower Affiant hereby deposes and says upon oath that those Representations referred to and se* torrr
In Section I above as Representations Nos 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and (If applicable) Representation No 7A are true and correct
B. By Seller Affiant Seller Affiant hereby deposes and says upon oath that those Representations referred to and set forr
Section I above as Representations Nos 2 and 6 are true and correct, and that Representations Nos 1,3, 4, 5. and (if appfacaote*
Representation No 7A, as referred to and aet forth in such Section, are true and correct to the best of Seller Affiant's knowledge
Information, and belief

(Signature)
(Seller Affiant)

(Signal *r«
(Seller Arte-?

(Signature)
(Borrower Affiant)

(Signat.r=
(Borrower Affia~*

(Signature)
(Borrower Affiant)

(Signal vre
(Borrower Affa^t

(Signature)
(Borrower Affiant)

(Signaler*
(Borrower Affiart

JWo&lA ^J^>^r^
DEBRA L . YOtfff&lArl

u

Sworn to and subscribed before me this

. day of

1st

JULY

1988

Notary public in and for

-SDRsrr, in
My commission expires

3/8/92

CERTIFICATE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY LENDER
The Lender hereby represents to and certifies for the reliance of, any party to which the Loan hereafter is sold or assigned that af cr me
applicable representations and statements contained in Sections I and III above are true and correct to the best of the Lender's knowteooe
information, and belief In addition, the Lender hereby acknowledges and accepts the Borrower covenant (if applicable) and the Induceoe"*
JSgreement, aet forth, respectively in Paragraphs A and B of Section II above
ove
i
AMCRISTAR FINANCIAL.CORPORATION

4
This form should be executed by the borrower(s), property aeller(s) ar.d lender on rhe date the Loan is ciosed )
ADVISORY NOTICE
4 any statement in the foregoing Affidavit and Agreement is made under oath by Borrower Affiant or Seller Affiant with knowledge that sucr
statement la false, the person making such false statement may be subject to civil and criminal penalties under applicable law
n addition, any breach of the covenant by Borrower Affiant relating to occupancy of the Property (as aet forth in Paragraph A of Sector i
•bova) will entitle the holder of the Note to exercise Its remedies for breach of covenant under the Security Instrument Such reme£»es
nclude, without limitation, requiring immediate payment In full of the remaining Indebtedness under the Loan together with all other sums
•ecurad by the Security Instrument, and exercise of power of sate or other applicableforeclosureremedies, to the extent ano; I r v t ^ raamer
iuthorized by the Security Instrument
- *- *• - ^ «^
Corpora*

CANARY -

franc*

PINK -

Sato

QOLDENROO

LOAN # 6772112

_ .

dflWHT
CtwwrABanti
" - •"• ' ' ' ' ""
!*516 South 7 t h East # 3 4 0 , H j r r a y , UT

Lender Nama^

Ameristar Financial Corp.

Lender Loan Numtoer

Lender Number

Borrows Nam*

111-6772112

YOUNGMAN, Debra
983 E . 3 r d A v e . , S a l t L a k e , UT 84103
Section 1-Loan Characteristics (Check all Applicable Categories)
Loan Type
n FHA
I i VA
XXConv

X X 1st Mon
1 1 ?nri Mntt

P Fixed Rate
X ARM Plan
No
IBLT

!

,

Loan Purpose
D Purchase
5C Refinance
If Refinance. Purpose

Buydown

J_

Occupancy
8 Primary Single-Family
Owner Occupied
D Second Home
D S . f . Investment
G 2-4 Family Investment
O 2-4 Family Owner Occuptec

Loan Terms
Original Lo*r<

trmmi Next

*vrt*> Monthly
Installmant

|D»U 0'
INOIC

360

'2574.79
1320000. 9 . 0 0
Section 2—Underwriting Information
Sates Price

Appraised Value

• N/A

•500.100.00

Property Type
1 ' Condominium Project Type
1 I PUD Project Tyoe

Loan to Value

63.99

*

; 1 Yes

Underwriter Name

Proposed Monthly Payments

Stable Monthly Income
Borrower

1 1 , 5 0 0 . 00

t

t

Borrower's Primary Residence

Total

Co Borrower

Other Income

$

•

1

Positive Cash
Flow (Subject
Property)

•

•

•

t 11.500.00

Angela K. Garza

Win. E. L i f f e r t h and Assoc.

William E. L i e f f e r t h

Total Income

De Minimus PUD
Other

SFD

Appraiser Name & Company Name

1 11,500.00

D

H Mo

_*

What is combined Loan-to Value Ratio?

B a * Income

Fannie Mae Loer *K

Connect Number

Property Address

• __2S24.79

Second Mortgage Pfcrl

$
•_
•_

Hazard Insurance
Taxes

80.00
450.00

Mortgage Insurance

t 11,500

»

First Mortgage P&l

JL°

Ratios

PrimarY Housing Expense /Income

27.0

%

Total Obligation/income

28.0

%

Home Owner Association Fees

•_

Other

•_
"7Q

Other Obligations

Investment Property Only

All Other Monthly Payments

$_
•_

Total All Monthly Payments

$_

Negative Cash Flow (Subject Property)

%

Debt Service Coverage Ratio

2l?A

Total Primary Housing Expense

8CK00
3184.79

Section 3—Lander's Underwriting Comments
Good r a t i o s , very low LTV, good c r e d i t , good job s t a b i l i t y , house i s part of the UtahState H i s t o r i c a l S o c i e t y .

Section 4 —Exhibits Submitted in Addition to Fannie Mae Standard Document Requirements
jj

l_4_

2

5

3-

IT

Section 6-Lender's Contact (Person to Whom Correspondence Should Be Directed)
Name

Title

Angela K. Garza

S-O..U,. Q

fa

L0 043 (8-86)(

Telephone No.

Underwriter

C3>to,l>t-CL

619/492-1556

Date

6-28-88

*:21S"

L AK

/\ MFRISTAR

-** rUS AND CONDITIONS

°

runnrc TII
LOAN #:

111-6772112

BRANCH:

&alt

Lake C i t y

NAME:

YOUNGMAN

DATE SUBMITTED:

*KSU».

6-26-66

The Above Referenced Loan I t :
Q

Approved

X © Subject to the following conditions

D

Suspended for the following

D

Declined/Cancelled (see comments)

Approval expires on:
Suspended Hems must be rec'd by:

Loan Amt: $ 3 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
XX

07D

LTV
D

A.
B.

N70/0

° 4 - ° % (W/2nd)

Fixed Rate

interest Rate:
2nd home
% O 1st Mtge

D Buydown XX

One

Yr. ARM

D Purchase 3 0 Refi

D 2nd Mtge

JttTbv*
D Cash Out

Loan Program:

Term:
B No Cash Back

TR-1

D Other: / ] ( IWPfiUhdzL

D.

D Subject to Mortgage Insurance Approval
°/t> Coverage PMI Co.:
D 'Evidence of Sale/CLSG of Property at:
Minimum net proceeds: $ .
D *2nd Mtg. in the amount of $
@ $
in compliance with program guidelines
D Evidence that the following accounts have been paid in full prior to or at the time of closing:

F.
G.
H.
I.
J.

D
D
D
D
D

K.

D 'VOE:

C.

Signed/Dated:

L.
M.
N.
O.
P.
O.
R.
S.
<S&t.
U
<&%
W.
X.

D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
63
D
E
D
B
1

30_ Yrs

Original Application/1003 _ _ _ _ _ Final 1003

K'Y

/Mo. to be

VYV\_^

Project Approval:
FNMA
FHLMC
'Satisfactory explanation for credit history at:.
'Satisfactory explanation for inquiries on credit report:
'Satisfactory credit history from:
'Satisfactory explanation of source of funds in account a t .
'VOD:
'Copy of current:
paystub
W-2 for:
Signed/Dated:
tax returns
P&L for: 19
, 19
19
'Copy of lease/rental agreement for:
FHA/VA conditions as attached
Evidence/Compliance with appraisal/CRV/Conditional Commitment requirements
'Clear Final Inspection with two sets of photos (3 with mortgage insurance)
'Satisfactory field review by an approved appraiser
(}
Provide recording information on the contract of sale shoving as item 015 on f', >—•
the preliminary t i t l e report.
>-_
Have appraiser resign page two of l e t t e r dated June 2Ath reparding aririiflntaa.?
comparables.
Also have him sipn short mv(>r Ipffpr ht> f>nr'\n<zf>A in f - M p . ( 3 * *>
Escrow to c e r t i f y sufficient funds fn rlngp.
^
Appraiser to supply one additional spf nf rnmp plrtnrps fnr rnmps ill thru #1? ~~

2. E NO CASH OUT
$&*< X Letter from borrower regarding reason for refinance.
The following Hems ere also required prior to closing:
^ f £ & (xj Acceptable title binder/prelim
02. D Acceptable survey/plat
03. D Flood Certification

04. D
<^^G&r-Q
06. D

"

Acceptable termite Inspection/Clearance
Acceptable hazard insurance policy
Acceptable evidence of flood insurance

Underwriting Comments:

•W" * * ^ 3
Corporate

of

», Q / T V » _ *

Ut£^*

*W2 QO 6-28-88

Angela Rw Garlax

°"*

Clients Notified of conditions on:
'Must be cleared by Underwriter prior to loan closing
LO 200 (1/W)

**s*m™
by:
^ _ V w i

Exhibit 7

Rule 3

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 4(b) is
added to the list of those rules that the appellate court may not suspend. The former list of
rules that the appellate court could not suspend concerned procedures and time limits
that confer jurisdiction upon the court. Under
Rule 4(b), the post-judgment motions listed
must be filed in a timely manner in the trial

court. If the motions are not filed in a timely
manner, the appellant may not take advantage
of Rule 4(b) that allows 30 days from the disposition of the motion to file the appeal. Both
appellate courts treat the failure to file postjudgment motions in a timely manner as a jurisdictional defect. Burgers v. Meredith, 652
P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Timely
filing.
When a motion for summary disposition was
clearly meritorious, it would support a suspen-

sion of the time limitation contained in Rule
10, Utah R. App. P. Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d
1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

TITLE II.
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF
TRIAL COURTS.
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the
petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the
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party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last
known address.
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court.
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing
and docketing fees are paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, together
with the docketing fee, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the
copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the appellate
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be docketed
under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such
name shall be added to the title.
Advisory Committee Note. — The designation of parties is changed to conform to the designation of parties in the federal appellate
courts
The rule is amended to make clear that the
mere designation of an appeal as a "cross-appeal" does not eliminate liability for payment
of the filing and docketing fees But for the

order of filing, the cross-appellant would have
been the appellant and so should be required to
pay the established fees
Cross-References. — Circuit courts, appeals from, § 78-4-11
Justice courts, appeals from, § 78-5-120
Juvenile courts, appeals from § 78-3a-51

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Absence of record
Attorney fees
Denial of intervention
Dismissal by trial court
Filing fees
Filing of notice
Final order or judgment
Judgment nunc pro tunc
Motion to strike
New trial
Partial judgment
Postjudgment orders
Purpose of notice
Review in equity cases
Summary judgment
Unsigned minute entry
Compiler's Notes. — All of the following
annotations are taken from cases decided under former Rule 3, R Utah S Ct
Absence of record.
There was nothing for the court to review
where the alleged error was not made part of
the record Powers v. Gene's Bldg Materials,
Inc, 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977)
Attorney fees.
Where plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees

by law, he was entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal in defending his judgment
without the necessity of having to file a cross
appeal Coates v American Economy Ins Co ,
627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981), Wallis v Thomas,
632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981)
Denial of intervention.
Order denying with prejudice an application
for intervention was appealable Tracy v University of Utah Hosp , 619 P.2d 340 (Utah
1980)
Dismissal by trial court.
Both an order to dismiss with prejudice, on
the merits of the issues under Rule 4Kb),
U R C P , and an order of dismissal without
prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1), U R C P , are
final adjudications of the issues and the time
for appeal under this rule begins to run with
the entry of the order Sterner v State, 27 Utah
2d 284, 495 P.2d 809 (1972)
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss was
not a final judgment subject to appeal Little v
Mitchell, 604 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979)
Dismissal without prejudice of plaintiffs action was appealable where the trial court's ruling went to the legal merits of any cause that
plaintiff may have framed Bowles v. State ex
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final judgment from which an appel could be
taken J.B & RE Walker, Inc v Thayn, 17
Utah 2d 120, 405 P 2d 342 (1965)
Where court granted one defendant's motion
to dismiss with prejudice and entered default
ludgment in favor of that defendant on his
counterclaim, but action against other defendants and one defendant's counterclaim remained alive, court's order was not final and
an appeal from it would be dismissed Kennedy
v New Era Indus , lnc , 600 P 2d 534 (Utah
1979)
A judgment which disposes of fewer than all
of the causes of action alleged in the plaintiffs
complaint is not a final judgment from which
an appeal mav be taken Salt Lake Cit> Corp
^ Layton, 600 P 2d 538 (Utah 1979)'
A partial summar> judgment is not generallv a final judgment and hence it is not appealable under the limitations prescribed bv
this rule South Shores Concession, Inc v
State, 600 P 2d 550 (Utah 1979)
District court order setting aside certain provisions in a default decree of divorce and providing for a further hearing on the matter was
not a final ruling from which an appeal could
be taken Pearson v Pearson, 641 P 2d 103
(Utah 1982)
Postjudgment orders.
An order vacating a judgment is not a final
order from which an appeal can be taken pursuant to this rule Van Wagenen v Walker,
597 P 2d 1327 (Utah 1979)
The final judgment rule does not preclude
review of postjudgment orders, such orders
were independently subject to the test of finality, according to their own substance and effect Cahoon v Cahoon, 641 P 2d 140 (Utah
1982)
Purpose of notice.
The object of a notice of appeal is to advise
the opposite partv that an appeal has been

Rule 4

taken from a specific judgment in a particular
case Nunley v Stan Katz Real Estate, lnc , 15
Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798 (1964)
Review in equit> cases.
In the appeal of an equity case the Supreme
Court mav weigh the facts as well as review
the law, but will reverse on the facts onlv when
the evidence clearlv preponderates against the
findings of the trial court Cnmmins v
Simonds, 636 P 2d 478 (Utah 1981)
In reviewing trial court's findings of fact in
equity cases, the Supreme Court would give
due deference to the trial court's decision and
reverse only when the evidence clearly preponderated against the trial court's findings
Jensen v Brown, 639 P 2d 150 (Utah 1981)
Summary judgment
Order setting aside summary judgment was
not final judgment from which aggrieved person might appeal as matter of right Jensen v
Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 P 2d 906 (1968)
Order denying a motion for summar> judgment was not a final order and was not appealable Denison v Crown Toyota Motors, Inc ,
571 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977)
A summary judgment in favor of one defendant alone does not constitute a final order of
judgment where the action against the remaining defendant remains alive Neider v State
Dep't of Transp , 665 P 2d 1306 (Utah 1983)
Unsigned minute entr>.
An unsigned minute entry did not constitute
an entry of judgment, nor was it a final judgment for purposes of appeal Wilson v Manning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982), Utah State
Tax Comm'n v Erekson, 714 P 2d 1151 (Utah
1986), Sather v Gross, 727 P 2d 212 (Utah
1986), Ahlstrom v Anderson, 728 P 2d 979
(Utah 1986)
An unsigned minute entry does not constitute a final order for purposes of appeal State
v Crowley, 737 P 2d 198 (Utah 1987)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Appealability of order suspending
imposition or execution of sentence, 51
A L R 4th 939

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
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shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1)
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires.
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court.
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
fending their judgment on appeal Wallis v.
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981).

ANALYSIS

Attorney fees.
Cross-appeal.
Extension of time to appeal.
Filing of notice.
Filing with county clerk.
Final order or judgment.
Post-judgment motions.
Premature notice.
Reconsideration of order.
Timeliness of notice.
—Date of notice.

Cross-appeal.
Subdivision (d) requires that a notice of
cross-appeal be timely filed. Absent a cross-appeal, a respondent may not attack the judgment of the court below. Henretty v. Manti
City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990) (decided
under former R. Utah S. Ct. 4).

Attorney fees.
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in de-

Extension of time to appeal.
Neither Rule 6(b), U.R.C.P., granting the
court power to extend a time limit where a failure to act in time is due to excusable neglect
generally, nor Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., authorizing the court to relieve from final judgment
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dence, internal confidential publications, office
memoranda, university press publications, and
publications of the state historical society. 1979

copying or transmission techniques to meet the needs
of the depository system.
1979

37-5-2. Commission to establish, operate a n d
maintain.
The commission shall establish, operate and maintain a publication collection, a bibliographic control
6ystem and depositories as provided in this act. 1979

37-5-8. Rules and regulations — Standards.
The commission may adopt rules and regulations
necessary to implement and administer the provisions of this act including standards which must be
met by libraries to obtain and retain a designation as
a depository library.
1979

37-5-3. Deposit of copies of publications with
commission.
(1) Each state agency shall deposit with the commission copies of each state publication issued by it in
such number as shall be specified by the state librarian.
(2) Each political subdivision shall deposit with
the commission two copies of each state publication
issued by it.
(3) The commission shall forward two copies of
each state publication deposited with it by a state
agency to the Library of Congress, one copy to the
state archivist, at least one copy to each depositorylibrary, and retain two copies.
(4) The commission shall forward one copy of each
state publication deposited with it by a political subdivision to t h e state archivist and retain the other
copy.
(5) Each state agency shall deposit with the commission two copies of audiovisual materials, and tape
or disc recordings issued by it for bibliographic listing
and retention in the state library collection. Materials not deemed by the commission to be of major
public interest will be listed but no copies will be
required for deposit.
1979
37-5-4. List of state agencies' state publications
— Distribution.
The commission shall publish a list of each state
agency's state publications, which shall provide access by agency, author, title, subject and such other
means as t h e commission may provide. The list shall
be published periodically and distributed to depository libraries, state agencies, state officers, members
of the Legislature and other libraries selected by the
commission, with at least an annual cumulation.
Each state agency shall furnish the commission and
the state archivist a complete list of its state publications for the previous year, annually.
1979
37-5-5. Designation a s depository library.
Upon application, a library in this state may be
designated as a complete or selective depository library by the commission.
1979
37-5-6. Contract to provide facilities and service
— Complete depository libraries — Selective depository libraries.
To be designated as a depository library, a library
must contract with the commission to provide adequate facilities for the storage and use of state publications, to render reasonable service without charge
to patrons and reasonable access to state publications. A complete depository library shall receive at
least one copy of all state publications issued by state
agencies. A selective depositor}' library shall receive
those state publications issued by state agencies pertinent to its selection profile and those specifically
requested by the library.
1979
37-5-7.

Micrographics a n d other copying a n d
transmission techniques.
The commission may use micrographics or other
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Chapter
1. Mechanics' Liens.
2. Miscellaneous Liens.
3. Lessors' Liens.
4. Common Carriers' Liens.
5. Judgment Lien — United States Courts.
6. Federal Tax Liens.
7. Hospital Lien Law.
8. Self-service Storage Facilities.
9. Penalty for Wrongful Lien.
10. Oil, Gas and Mining Liens.
CHAPTER 1
MECHANICS' LIENS
Section
38-1-1.
38-1-2.
38-1-3.
38-1-4.
38-1-5.
38-1-6.
38-1-7.
38-1-8.
38-1-9.
38-1-10.
38-1-11.
38-1-12.
38-1-13
38-1-14.
38-1-15.
38-1-16.
38-1-17.
38-1-18.
38-1-19.
38-1-20.
38-1-21.
38-1-22.
38-1-23.
38-1-24.

Public buildings not subject to act.
"Contractors" and "subcontractors" defined.
Those entitled to lien — What may be attached.
Amount of land affected — Lots and subdivisions — Franchises, fixtures, and appurtenances.
Priority — Over other encumbrances.
Priority over claims of creditors of original
contractor or subcontractor.
Notice of claim — Contents — Recording —
Service on owner of property.
Liens on several separate properties in one
claim.
Notice imparted by record
Laborers' and materialmen's lien on equal
footing regardless of time of filing.
Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens —
Action for debt not affected.
Repealed.
Parties — Joinder — Intervention
Decree — Order of satisfaction.
Sale — Redemption — Disposition of proceeds.
Deficiency judgment.
Costs — Apportionment — Costs and attorneys' fee to subcontractor.
Attorneys' fees.
Payment by owner to contractor — Subcontractor's lien not affected.
When contract price not payable in cash —
Notice.
Advance payments — Effect on subcontractor's lien.
Advance payments under terms of contract
— Effect on liens.
Creditors cannot reach materials furnished, except for purchase price.
Cancellation of record — Penalty.
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Section
38-1-25.
38-1-26.

Ahuse of lien right — Penalty.
Assignment of lien

38-1-1. Public buildings not subject to act.
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to
any public building, structure or improvement.
1953
38-1-2.

"Contractors" and "subcontractors" defined.
Whoever shall do work or furnish materials by contract, express or implied, with the owner, as in this
chapter provided, shall be deemed an original contractor, and all other persons doing work or furnishing materials shall be deemed subcontractors.
1953
38-1-3.

T h o s e entitled to lien — What may be
attached.
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing or renting any
materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building or structure
or improvement to any premises in any manner and
licensed architects and engineers and artisans who
have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien
upon the property upon or concerning which they
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished
or rented materials or equipment for the value of the
service rendered, labor performed, or materials or
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively,
whether at the instance of the owner or of any other
person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or
otherwise. This lien shall attach only to such interest
as the owner may have in the property.
1987
38-1-4.

Amount of land affected — Lots and subdivisions — Franchises, fixtures, and
appurtenances.
The liens granted by this chapter shall extend to
and cover so much of the land whereon such building,
structure, or improvement shall be made as may be
necessary for convenient use and occupation of the
land. In case any such building shall occupy two or
more lots or other subdivisions of land, such lots or
subdivisions shall be considered as one for the purposes of this chapter. The liens provided for in this
chapter shall attach to all franchises, privileges, appurtenances, and to all machinery and fixtures, pertaining to or used in connection with any such lands,
buildings, structures, or improvements.
1987
38-1-5. Priority — Over other encumbrances.
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to,
and take effect as of, the time of the commencement
to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the
structure or improvement, and shall have priority
over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which
may have attached subsequently to the time when
the building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on
the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and
which was unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement was commenced, work begun, or
first material furnished on the ground.
1953
38-1-6.

Priority over claims of creditors of original contractor or subcontractor.
No attachment, garnishment or levy under an execution upon any money due to an original contractor
from the owner of any property subject to lien under

38-1-9

this chapter shall be valid as against any lien of a
subcontractor or materialman, and no such attachment, garnishment or levy upon any money due to a
subcontractor or materialman from the contractor
shall be valid as against any lien of a laborer employed by the day or piece
1953
38-1 -7.

Notice of claim — Contents — Recording
— Service on owner of property.
(D Every original contractor within 100 days after
the completion of his contract, and except as provided
in this section, every person other than the original
contractor who claims the benefit of this chapter
within 80 days after furnishing the last material or
performing the last labor for or on any land, building,
improvement, or structure shall file for record with
the county recorder of the county in which the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien.
(21 This notice shall contain a statement setting
forth the following information:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or,
if not known, the name of the record owrner;
(b) the name of the person by whom he was
employed or to whom he furnished the material;
(c) the time when the first and last labor was
performed, or the first and last material was furnished;
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for
identification; and
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his
authorized agent, and the date signed.
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien,
the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by certified
mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of
the real property a copy of the notice of lien. If the
record owner's current address is not readily available, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the lastknown address of the record owner, using the names
and addresses appearing on the last completed real
property assessment rolls of the county where the affected property is located. Failure to deliver or mail
the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of
costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or
record owner in an action to enforce the lien.
(4) When a subcontractor or any person furnishes
labor or material as stated in Subsections (1) through
(3> at the request of an original contractor, then the
final date for the filing of a notice of intention to hold
and claim a lien for a subcontractor or a person furnishing labor or materia! at tht- request of an original
contractor is 80 days after completion of the original
contract of the original contractor.
1987
38-1-8.

Liens on several separate properties in
one claim.
Liens against two or more buildings or other improvements owned by the same person may be included in one claim; but in such case the person filing
the claim must designate the amount claimed to be
due to him on each of such buildings or other improvements.
1987
38-1-9. Notice imparted by record.
(1) The recorder must record the claim in an index
maintained for that purpose.
(2) From the time the claim is filed for record, all
persons are considered to have notice of the claim.
1987
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38-1-10
38-1-10.

Laborers' and materialmen's lien on
equal footing regardless of time of filing.
The hens for work and labor done or materia? furnished as provided in this chapter shall be upon an
equal footing, regardless of date of filing the notice
and claim of lien and regardless of the time of performing such work and labor or furnishing such material.
1953
38-1-11.

Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens
— Action for debt not affected.
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for
must be begun within twelve months after the completion of the original contract, or the suspension of
work thereunder for a period of thirty days. Within
the twelve months herein mentioned the hen claimant shall file for record with the county recorder of
each county in which the hen is recorded a notice of
the pendency of the action, in the manner provided in
actions affecting the title or right to possession of real
property, or the hen shall be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the action and
persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action, and the burden of proof shall be
upon the lien claimant and those claiming under him
to show such actual knowledge. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair or affect the right
of any person to whom a debt may be due for any
work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal action to recover the same
1953
38-1-12.

Repealed.

1981

38-1-13. Parties — Joinder — Intervention.
Lienors not contesting the claims of each other may
join as plaintiffs, and when separate actions are commenced the court may consolidate them and make all
persons having claims filed parties to the action.
Those claiming hens who fail or refuse to become parties plaintiff may be made parties defendant, and any
one not made a party may at any time before the final
hearing intervene.
1953
38-1-14. Decree — Order of satisfaction.
In every case in which hens are claimed against the
same property the decree shall provide for their satisfaction in the following order:
(1) Subcontractors who are laborers or mechanics working by the day or piece, but without
furnishing materials therefor,
(2> All other subcontractors and all materialmen;
(3) The original contractors.
1953
38-1-15.

Sale — R e d e m p t i o n — Disposition of
proceeds.
The court shall cause the property to be sold in
satisfaction of the liens and costs as in the case of
foreclosure of mortgages, subject to the same right of
redemption If the proceeds of sale after the payment
of costs shall not be sufficient to satisfy the whole
amount of liens included in the decree, then such proceeds shall be paid in the order above designated, and
pro rata to the persons claiming in each class where
the sum realized is insufficient to pay the persons of
such class in full. Any excess shall be paid to the
owner.
1953
38-1-16. Deficiency judgment.
Every person whose claim is not satisfied as herein
provided may have judgment docketed for the balance
unpaid, and execution therefor against the party personally liable.
1953
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38-1-17.

Costs — Apportionment — Costs and
attorneys' fee to subcontractor.
As between the owner and the contractor the court
shall apportion the costs according to the right of the
case, but in all cases each subcontractor exhibiting a
lien shall have his costs awarded to him. including
the costs of preparing and recording the notice of
claim of hen and such reasonable attorney's fee as
may be incurred in preparing and recording said notice of claim of hen
1961
38-1-18. Attorneys' fees.
In any action brought to enforce any hen under this
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action.
1961

38-1-19.

Payment by owner to contractor —
S u b c o n t r a c t o r ' s lien not affected.
When any subcontractor shall have actually begun
to furnish labor or materials for which he is entitled
to a lien no payment to the original contractor shall
impair or defeat such lien; and no alteration of any
contract shall affect any lien acquired under the provisions of this chapter.
1953
38-1-20.

When contract price not payable in
cash — Notice.
As to all hens, except that of the contractor, the
whole contract price shall be payable in money, except as herein provided, and shall not be diminished
by any prior or subsequent indebtedness, offset or
counterclaim in favor of the owner and against the
contractor, except when the owner has contracted to
pay otherwise than in cash, in which case the owner
shall post in a conspicuous place on the premises a
statement of the terms and conditions of the contract
before materials are furnished or labor is performed,
which notice must be kept posted, and when so posted
shall give notice to all partie> interested of the terms
and conditions of the contract. Any person willfully
tearing down or defacing such notice is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
1953
38-1-21.

A d v a n c e payments — Effect on subcontractor's lien.
No payment made prior to the time when the same
is due under the terms and conditions of the contract
shall be valid for the purpose of defeating, diminishing or discharging a m lien in favor of any person
except the contractor, but as to any such hen such
payment shall be deemed as if not made, notwithstanding that the contractor to whom it was paid ma\
thereafter abandon his contract or be or become indebted tc the ownei for damages for nonperformance
of his contract or otherwise.
1953
38-1-22.

A d v a n c e payments under terms of contract — Effect on liens.
The subcontractors' hens provided for in this chapter shall extend to the full contract price, but if at the
time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials the owner has paid upon the contract, in accordance with the terms thereof, any portion of the contract price, either in money or property, the hen of
the contractor shall extend only to such unpaid balance, and the lien of any subcontractor who has notice of such payment shall be limited to the unpaid
balance of the contract price. No part of the contract
price shall by the terms of any contract be made payable, nor shall the same or any part thereof be paid in
advance of the commencement of the work, for the
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purpose of evading or defeating the provisions of this
chapter.
1953
38-1-23.

Creditors cannot reach materials furnished, except for purchase price.
Whenever materials have been furnished for use in
the construction, alteration or repair of any building,
work or other improvement mentioned in Section
38-1-3 such materials shall not be subject to attachment, execution or other legal process to enforce any
debt due by the purchaser of such materials, other
than a debt due for the purchase money thereof, so
long as in good faith the same are about to be applied
to the construction, alteration or repair of such building or improvement.
1953
38-1-24. Cancellation of record — Penalty.
The claimant of any lien filed as provided herein,
on the payment of the amount thereof together with
the costs incurred and the fees for cancellation, shall
at the request of any person interested in the property charged therewith cause said lien to be canceled
of record within ten days from the request, and upon
failure to so cancel his lien within the time aforesaid
shall forfeit and pay to the person making the request
the sum of $20 per day until the same shall be canceled, to be recovered in the same manner as other
debts.
1953
38-1-25. Abuse of lien right — Penalty.
Any person who knowingly causes to be filed for
record a claim of lien against any property, which
contains a gTeater demand than the sum due him.
with the intent to cloud the title, or to exact from the
owner or person liable by means of such excessive
claim of lien more than is due him, or to procure any
advantage or benefit whatever, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
1953
38-1-26. Assignment of lien.
All liens under this chapter shall be assignable as
other choses in action, and the assignee may commence and prosecute actions thereon in his own name
in the manner herein provided.
1953
CHAPTER 2
MISCELLANEOUS LIENS
Section
38-2-1.
38-2-2.
38-2-3.

Lien on livestock — For feed and care.
Liens of hotels and boardinghouse keepers.
Repairman's lien on personal property —
Lien subject to rights of secured parties
38-2-3.1. Special lien on personal property for services rendered — General lien of dry
cleaning establishments, laundries, and
shoe repair shops.
38-2-3.2. Sale of unclaimed personal property.
38-2-4.
Disposal of property by lienholder — Procedure.
38-2-5.
Action for deficiency.
38-2-1. Lien on livestock — For feed and care.
Every ranchman, farmer, agistor, herder of cattle,
tavern keeper or livery stable keeper to whom any
domestic animals shall be entrusted for the purpose
of feeding, herding or pasturing shall have a lien
upon such animals for the amount that may be due
him for such feeding, herding or pasturing, and is
authorized to retain possession of such animals until
such amount is paid.
1953

38-2-3.2

38-2-2.

Liens of hotels and b o a r d i n g h o u s e
keepers.
Every innkeeper, hotel keeper, boardinghouse or
lodgmghouse keeper shall have a lien on the baggage
and other property in and about such inn belonging to
or under control of his guests or boarders for the
proper charge,^ due him for their accommodation,
board and lodging, for money paid for or advanced to
them, and for such other extras as are furnished at
their request. The innkeeper, hotel keeper, boardinghouse or lodgmghouse keeper may detain such baggage and other property until the amount of such
charge is paid, and the baggage and other property
shall not be exempt from attachment or execution
until the hotel or boardinghouse keeper's lien and the
costs of enforcing it are satisfied.
1953
38-2-3.

Repairman's lien on personal property
— Lien subject to rights of secured
parties.
Every person who shall make, alter or repair, or
bestow labor upon, any article of personal property at
the request of the owner or other person entitled to
possession thereof shall have a lien upon such article
for the reasonable value of the labor performed and
materials furnished and used in making such article
or in altering or repairing the same, and may retain
possession thereof until the amount so due is paid:
provided such lien and right to possession shall be
subject and subordinate to the rights and interests of
any secured partie.- in such personal property unless
such secured party has requested such person to
make, alter or repair or bestow labor upon such property.
1977
38-2-3.1.

Special lien on personal property for
services rendered — General lien of
dry cleaning establishments, laundries, and shoe repair shops.
Every person who, while lawfully in possession of
an article of personal property, renders any service to
the owner or owners thereof, by labor or skill performed upon said personal property at the request or
order of said owner, has a special lien thereon, dependent on possession, for the compensation, if any,
which is due to him from the owner or owners for
such service; and every laundry proprietor, person
conducting a laundry business, dry cleaning establishment, proprietor and person conducting a dry
cleaning establishment, shoe repair establishment
proprietor and person conducting a shoe repair establishment has a general lien, dependent on possession,
upon all personal property in his hands belonging to a
customer, for the balance due him from such customer for laundry work, and for the balance due him
for dry cleaning work, and for the balance due him for
shoe repair work; but nothing in this section shall be
construed to confer a lien in favor of a wholesale dry
cleaner on materials received from a dry cleaning establishment proprietor or a person conducting a dry
cleaning establishment. The terms "person" and "proprietor" as used in this section shall include an individual, firm, partnership, association, corporation
and company.
1953
38-2-3.2. Sale of unclaimed personal property.
(A) Any garments, clothing, shoes, wearing apparel or household good.-, remaining in the possession
of a person, on which cleaning, pressing, glazing,
laundry or washing or repair work has been done or
upon which alterations or repairs have been made or
on which materials or supplies have been used or furnished by said person holding possession thereof, for
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Section
57-3-3.
57-3-4.

57-3-4. Certified copies entitled to record in another county — Effect.
Whenever a document is of record in .the office of
the county recorder of any county, a copy of the record
of the document certified by the county recorder may
be recorded in the office of the county recorder of any
other county. The recording of a certified copy in t h e
office of the county recorder of another county h a s t h e
same force and effect as if the original document had
been recorded in the other county.
1988

57-3-1. Certificate of acknowledgment or of
proof of execution a prerequisite.
A certificate of the acknowledgment of any document, or of the proof of the execution of any document
t h a t is signed and certified by the officer taking t h e
acknowledgment as provided in this title, entitles the
document and t h e certificate to be recorded in the
office of the recorder of the county where the real
property is located.
1988

57-3-5 to 57-3-9. Repealed.

Effect of failure to record.
Certified copies entitled to record in another county — Effect.
57-3-5 to 57-3-9. Repealed.
57-3-10. Legal description of real property and
names and addresses required in instruments.
57-3-11. Original documents required — Captions
— Legibility.

57-3-2. Record imparts notice — Recordation
not affected by change in interest rate
— Validity of document not affected —
Third person not charged with notice
of unnamed interests — Conveyance
free and clear of unrecorded interests.
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and
certified, in the manner prescribed by this title; each
original document or certified copy of a document
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged; and each financing statement complying
with Section 10A-9-402, whether or not acknowledged; shall, from the time of filing with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of
their contents.
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a
change in the interest rate in accordance with the
terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying
secured obligation does not affect the notice or alter
the priority of the document provided under Subsection (1).
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a
document with respect to the parties to the document
and all other persons who have notice of the document.
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only
a nominal consideration, names the grantee as
trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without
naming beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust
does not charge any third person with notice of any
interest of the grantor or of the interest of any other
person not named in the document.
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to him free and clear of all
claims not disclosed in the document in which he appears as grantee or in any other document recorded in
accordance with this title that sets forth the names of
the beneficiaries, specifies the interest claimed, and
describes the real property subject to the interest.
19*8

57-3-3. Effect of failure to record.
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any subsequent purchaser of the
same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the
property in good faith and for a valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's conveyance is
first duly recorded.
1988

1955.1963,1988

57-3-10. Legal description of real property a n d
n a m e s and addresses required in documents.
(1) A document executed after July 1,1983, is entitled to be recorded in the office of any county recorder
only if t h e document contains a legal description of
the real property affected.
(2 > A document affecting title to real property presented for recording after July 1, 1981, is entitled to
be recorded in the office of any county recorder only if
the document contains the names and mailing addresses of t h e grantees in addition to the legal description required under Subsection (1).
(3) Each county recorder shall refuse to accept a
document for recording if it does not conform to t h e
requirements under this section.
1988
57-3-11. Original documents required — Captions — Legibility.
Unless otherwise provided, documents presented
for recording \r\ the office of t h e county recorder shall
be originals and shall contain a brief caption stating
the nature of the document. Documents presented for
recording shall also be sufficiently legible for the recorder to make certified copies.
1988
CHAPTER 4
VALIDATING CERTAIN C O N V E Y A N C E S
(Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 155, § 24.)
57-4-1 t o 57-4-4.

Repealed.
CHAPTER 4a

EFFECTS OF RECORDING
Section
57-4a-l.
57-4a-2.

Document recordable despite defects.
Recorded document imparts notice of contents despite defects.
57-4a-3. Public document recordable without acknowledgment.
57-4a-4. Presumptions.

57-4a-l. Document recordable despite defects.
Each document executed and acknowledged on or
before July 1, 1988, may be recorded in the office of
the county recorder regardless of any defect or irregularity in its execution, attestation, or acknowledgment.
1988
57-4a-2. Recorded document imparts notice of
contents despite defects.
A recorded document imparts notice of its contents
regardless of any defect, irregularity, or omission in
its execution, attestation, or acknowledgment. A certified copy of a recorded document is admissible as
evidence to the same extent the original document
would be admissible as evidence.
1988

78-2-2

JUDICIAL CODE

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b,
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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